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by
Clare Epstein
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This thesis investigates the relationships between disorder, quality of life crimes and
perception of transit systems. The transit security strategies and security background of
five transit agencies WMATA, NYCT, BART, LACMTA, and Metrovias, are discussed.
Based on the findings of the case studies, this research then develops policy
recommendations in five areas related to security: Quality of Life Ordinances,
Concessions, Management Options, CCTVs, and Design Issues. This thesis compares
the case studies and analyzes the 1995 National Transit Database security data. Lastly,
this research applies the policy recommendations for the five security areas to and
suggests evaluation techniques for the Tren Urbano system in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
This thesis contributes to current transit security research by; evaluating specific policy
approaches to transit security; analyzing the context in which transit agencies make
decisions and evaluate transit security strategies; comparing transit agencies; and
investigating the crime statistics of the National Transit Database.
The research demonstrates that transit agencies recognize the importance of preventing
quality of life offenses and have developed many quality of life security strategies. The
National Transit Database documents that heavy rail systems have higher rates of crime
than transit systems as a whole. Findings from the database, the case studies, and the
strategies suggest that transit agencies should develop a systematic approach to
preventing quality of life transit security offenses, utilize techniques of community policing
and the help of non-security personnel, develop enforcement mechanisms to combat
quality of life offenses, continue to utilize design and technology tools, and create better
mechanisms to evaluate quality of life security strategies and programs.
Thesis Supervisor: Nigel Wilson
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Introduction
This thesis examines the relationships between disorder, quality of life crime, and transit security.
These relationships are investigated by examining current research and the security practices and
policies of five transit agencies; WMATA, NYCT, BART, LACMTA and Metrovias. This thesis
presents the management policies, design and technology strategies, and evaluation procedures
for each of the case studies. Five key areas, Quality of Life Ordinances, Concessions,
Management Options, CCTVs, and Design Issues that deal with quality of life transit security are
discussed in this thesis as well. These five areas provide insight into complexity of transit security
and form the basis of recommended approaches to transit agencies interested in improving
security.
To gain an understanding of the actual crime and the relationships between more serious crime
and the quality of life crime occurring on transit systems, this thesis examines data provided by the
1995 National Transit Database. The thesis then compares and evaluates the case study systems,
based on data from the National Transit Database, the recommendations in the five key areas, and
research from the case studies. Lastly this thesis provides transit security recommendations for the
Tren Urbano system in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
1.1 Disorder, Quality of Life, and Transit Security
1.1.1 Quality of Life Crimes
In recent years many urban residents across the United States have had to face disorder and crime
in their daily lives. One indication of this disorder is the vast number of "quality of life" offenses
evident in the city. Quality of life offenses are defined as those crimes that disturb or disrupt
citizens and increase their sense of discomfort and fear even though they do not physically threaten
citizens. My definition of these offenses includes the following-disorderly conduct,
homelessness/vagrancy, drunkenness, liquor law violations, smoking/eating, drinking/littering/loud
Umusic, public urination, and graffiti. Quality of life crimes are signals of disorder and create the
perception that the city and its transit system are not safe.
Urban transit systems, like the cities in which they are located, are affected by the disorder
characterized by quality of life crime. In older cities, urban transit systems, especially those with
subway or elevated routes, may be older structures which have suffered from prolonged under-
investment and lack of repair. The disrepair and age of the system and/or the use of the system by
the homeless and vagrants, who are often found in America's urban centers, contributes to the
disorder of the system. Transit passengers can feel trapped while waiting on an underground
platform or exposed while waiting on an elevated structure.
Nathan Glazer expresses the relationship between disorder, quality of life crimes and perception on
transit eloquently:
While I do not find myself consciously making the connection between the graffiti-makers and criminals who
occasionally rob, rape, assault, and murder passengers, the sense that all are part of one world of uncontrollable
predators seems inescapable. Even if the graffitists are the least dangerous of these, their ever present markings
serve to persuade the passenger, that indeed., the subway is a dangerous place-a mode of transportation to be
used only when one has no T issue of graffiti is .....also one of reducing the ever-present sense
of fear, of making the subway appear a less dangerous and tupleasantl place to the possible user (1984, p. 210-
211).
1.1.2 Perception and Disorder
Transit systems thus need to place emphasis on transit security, protecting people and property
from other people on the transit system (Richards and Hoel, 1980, p. 2).1 Transit agencies focus on
quality of life crimes as a method to maintain order and to increase passenger perception that
transit is safe. In a transit system, the perception of danger is as important as the real rate of crime.
If passengers perceive that the system is unsafe, they will be reluctant to use it and will choose to
travel by other modes. Several studies demonstrate the importance that security (or perceived
security) plays in ridership patterns and transit use.
1 Notice the difference between transit security and transit safety. The Federal Transit Administration defines security as
freedom from intentional danger and safety as freedom from danger.
a In the 1960's Paine et al conducted a transit study in Philadelphia and found that personal
security was at the top of a list of 33 variables that influence the use of transit in Philadelphia
(qtd. in Ingalls et al., 1994, Vol No. 1433, p. 201).
m In a recent survey in which participants ranked objectives important in creating effective
intermodal stations, Alan Horowitz found that Safety and Security Objectives ranked the
highest (1995, p. 30).
n In the 1970's Shellow et al. conducted a telephone survey of 1,556 persons in a particular city
and found that transit security affected ridership especially rapid transit ridership. He writes 'But
when it came to rapid transit, itself, 25 percent of those who do not use it and 30 percent of
bus-only riders cited lack of security for not riding trains' (1974, Vol 487, p. 3).
n Thrasher and Schnell also conducted a series of studies relating passenger perceptions to
transit security and to transit ridership. They found that personal security was a factor in
influencing travel behaviors (1974, Vol 487, p. 32). Both Stellow and Thrasher and Schnell
found that time of travel greatly influenced passenger perceptions of security as many
passengers did not want to travel at night.
Studies have also found that different transit users perceive the security of transit differently.
Females and elderly (both groups which are a disproportionately high users of transit) feel more
vulnerable when using transit and have a greater perceived risk and fear of transit. A recent study
by G. Lynch and S. Atkins found that women would change their travel behavior to avoid an unsafe
situation (qtd. in Hoel, 1992, Chapter 18, p. 509).
Wilson and Kelling argue that maintaining order and deterring quality of life crimes are essential in
changing people's perception of whether an area is safe or not. Studies in Boston of public housing
projects found that persons residing in projects that were disorderly had the most fear, although
these areas did not have the highest crime rates (Wilson, 1983, p. 80). Similarly while many riders
perceive transit systems to be unsafe, studies have demonstrated that transit systems are actually
significantly safer than the surrounding city streets. In a study of a rapid transit system, robbery
rates on transit were a 1/3 of the rate occurring in the city as a whole (Shellow et al., 1974, p. 5).
Disorder and crime may also be linked in a very real sequence. This connection is often explained
by the broken windows analogy-if one window in a building is left broken and unrepaired-the
other windows will soon be broken. Similarly if panhandling and vagrancy go unchecked, so will
robbery and other more serious crimes (Wilson & Kelling, 1981, p. 8). In addition, cracking down
on disorder may prevent, or at least allow police to catch the perpetrators of, more serious crime.
For example, transit agencies have found that that when they cracked down on lesser crime such
as fare evasion, many of the fare evaders were also wanted for more serious crimes.
1.1.3 Community Policing and Physical Design
Two techniques have been developed as methods to fight disorder and improve passenger
perception both on urban streets and in transit systems; one is community policing and the other is
the use of physical design tools.
Community policing involves the use of police on foot patrol (instead of automobile patrol). In a
study conducted by the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C. of neighborhood patrols in Newark,
NJ, foot patrol did not reduce crime rates. But neighborhood residents felt safer and police were
more satisfied with their job. Foot patrol allowed police officers to deal with the disorder of the
neighborhood on a better level and to create rules to deal with disorderly people (Wilson & Kelling,
1981, p. 2).
Community policing allows police to better enforce the informal social controls of a neighborhood or
area. Other research also advocates the use of citizens groups to maintain order. Kenney
describes the role that the Guardian Angels and citizens advocacy groups played in maintaining
order in the New York subway system (1984). Recent trends in the 1990's continue to emphasize
community policing but also demonstrate the increased role of private security guards and
community groups in maintaining order.2
Order maintenance and improving informal social networks may also be enhanced by physical
design. The idea that the design of the physical environment can affect people's actual and
perceived security is not a new one. Jane Jacob's historic book The Death and Life of American
Cities expresses the importance of designing the street so that there are eyes on the street.
Jacobs stresses the importance of having people (normal citizens) watch space to ensure security
and mixing the use of public and private space. She writes:
The basic requisite for such surveillance is a substantial quantity of stores and other public places
sprinkled along the sidewalks of a district; enterprises and public places that are used by evening and night
must be among them especially (1961, p. 36).
In 1972, Oscar Newman developed his defensible space theory in which he stated that some
physical environments were less conducive to crime than others. He used four models towards
which physical design should aim: Territorial spheres-in which people feel proprietary about their
neighborhood and environment; natural surveillance-in which design strives to enable people to
watch public and private space from many view points; linkages--which enhance safety of an area
by linking it to more communal uses; and peculiarity reduction, in which a given space can be fixed
to fit in with the built environment. Defensible space theory works at strengthening the informal
social networks so important to maintaining order (1973, p. 2).
Situation crime prevention is less dramatic than defensible space theory and has grown out of the
field of environmental criminology. Situation crime prevention attempts to "reduce the opportunities
for crime by increasing the effort that the offender must invest, increasing the risks he must take,
and reducing the rewards" (Murray, 1995, p. 358).
2 The America Departrnent of Justice notes that in 1977 there were 900 residential patrols, in 1996 there are "several
thousand." In 1970 the ratio of public to private police was 1.4:1 currently the ratio of public to private police is 1:3. (The
Eoons,1997, p. 21)
A recent anthology Preventinq Mass Transit Crime details several case studies in which
transportation authorities implemented physical changes in transportation facilities to reduce crime
(Clarke, 1996). In addition several manuals exist on design guidelines for transit security.3
1.1.4 Current Transit Strategies and Government Emphasis
Transit agencies have developed strategies to deal with quality of life crimes and with other crimes,
based in part on community policing and physical design.4 A recent survey demonstrated that
transit agencies spend most of their security resources on deterring quality of life crimes. These
strategies refer to a myriad of practices, procedures, and policies used by the transit agency to
deter crime. These strategies encompass the entire transit system and also agencies and
resources outside the system. Labor and management practices as well as technological devices
and physical design are important components of a systemwide transit security plan. Security
plans and strategies vary by type of crime, transit agency and transit modes.
Three resources, Perspectives on Transit Security in the 1990s: Strategies for Success
Perspectives on Transit Security in the 90's-Workshop Summary, and Transit Security Procedures
Guide list many system-wide strategies for grappling with transit security.
Due to the importance of transit security and quality of life crimes to transit use, the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) has also placed added emphasis on transit security. This emphasis includes
improved transit security data and state oversight legislation. Beginning in 1995, transit agencies
who receive federal funds are responsible for recording Part I and Part 11 transit crimes to the FTA
using the Uniformed Code Reporting system. These data are now part of the National Transit
Database.
3 In 1976 the Southern California Association of Governments prepared a report entitled Transit Safety and Security a design
framework. This manual provided for design guidelines and procedures in the follow areas-parking facility, park and rides,
subway station designs. In addition Lester Hoel lists some architectural design factors in Chapter 18 of Public
Transportation.
4 Transit crime encompasses a wide variety of crimes and includes a wide variety of transit strategies. The scope of transit
crime includes general security issues (crimes and situations such as dnjnkenness disorderly conduct, drug violations,
homelessness and minor sex offenses), crimes against passengers,(includes theft, physical assaults, sexual assault) crimes
against the transit system (fare evasion, fare theft, suicide attempts, vandalism, trespassing and theft) crimes against the
public (hostage situations, hijackings, and bomb threats) (Balog et al. 1994, pp. 89-139L
ISTEA which was enacted in December 18, 1991 added Section 28 to the Federal Transit
Administration Act (FTA Act). The FTA was required to issue regulations to create a state
oversight program for all defined rail fixed guideway systems(PennDOT RTSRP, 1995, p. 2).
As part of the state oversight program, the state oversight agency must develop and adopt a
system safety program plan (SSPP) that at a minimum complies with the APTA manual for the
Development of Rail Transit SSPP and includes a section which addresses the personal security of
passengers and employers. The state oversight agency requires that the transit agency adopt a
SSPP consistent with these minimum standards (PennDOT RTSRP, 1995, p. 5).
The FTA has not yet developed specifications or standards for the oversight agency to follow in
creating security procedures but recommends two FTA documents, Transit Security Procedures
Guide and Transit Systems Security Program Planning Guide. (PennDOT RTSRP, 1995, p. 7).
The Transit System Security Program Planning Guide explains the steps a transit agency should
follow to develop a security program. This security program should follow a systems approach by
developing security methods that encompass the entire transit system. The Transit Security
Procedures Guide lists ways to prevent security incidents, describes the varying types of transit
crime that occur and discusses methods and strategies to deal with each of these crimes. The
philosophy behind both of these guides is that a security plan and preventative planning can help
prevent transit crime and offenses.
1.2 Research Objective and Scope of Paper
Due to the importance of quality of life offenses, and the unique security attributes of rail systems,
this research focuses specifically on the quality of life offenses in rail systems. This paper attempts
to fill a gap in current research and transit agency practices by evaluating transit security practices,
highlighting the context in which transit agencies make decisions, and presenting evaluation
techniques used by the transit agencies. To date transit agencies and transit security research
have not carefully examined the success or failure of quality of life transit security practices, nor has
prior research effectively documented the context in which transit agencies make security
decisions. In addition, this paper unlike previous research efforts, analyzes crime statistics of the
thirty largest transit agencies in the United States.
The purposes of this paper are:
" to explain the theoretical and practical importance of quality of life offenses and the
connections of these offenses to passenger perception, and transit security;
" to analyze and compare the security programs of several transit agencies;
" to describe and evaluate the transit security strategies currently used by rail systems to deter
quality of life offenses; and
" to apply these strategies and lessons to the Tren Urbano system in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
The hypothesis in this study is that transit agencies can increase the quality of life on their transit
system and passengers' perceived security of the system, by carefully implementing security
policies and practices and by continually analyzing and evaluating these policies and practices.
To learn more about how to evaluate transit security strategies and issues, the practices of several
case study agencies were analyzed. Chapter 2 highlights the security programs and strategies of
these transit agencies and describes the context in which transit agencies make decisions about
quality of life strategies. The case study agencies include: New York City Transit Authority, Bay
Area Rapid Transit, Washington D.C. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. For each case study agency, this chapter presents
the history of the transit agency; the security strategies (both physical decisions and management
tools) and their program and strategy evaluation measures.
A case study on Buenos Aires is also included in this section. This case study provides insight into
how transit systems in Latin America deal with security strategies. An understanding of Latin
American security issues may facilitate recommendations for the Tren Urbano system, a rapid
transit system currently in the early stages of construction in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Chapter 3 analyzes five areas affecting quality of life security being utilized by the case study transit
agencies: Quality of Life Ordinances, Concessions, Management Options, Closed Circuit TV, and
Design Issues. In each area the approaches used by each of the case studies are discussed and
a recommended policy is suggested. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a greater
understanding and context to transit security research, highlight important issues in transit security
and to attack difficulty in transit security policy evaluation.
Chapter 4 discusses security data from the 1995 National Transit Database including a comparison
of crime levels at the thirty largest transit agencies, crime levels on rail systems; and metropolitan
crime rates. Chapter 4 then compares and evaluates the case studies by using a set of criteria.
The criteria used to evaluate the case studies include: actual crime rates, passenger perceptions,
actions on each of the five quality of life areas, and their overall transit security programs. 5
Next Chapter 5 describes the Tren Urbano project in San Juan, Puerto Rico and the security
concerns of the project. The Tren Urbano as a turnkey system offers challenges and opportunities
for innovative security strategies and policies. The potential problems and opportunities of
implementing a security program under a Design Build Operate and Maintain Contract are
described. Chapter 5 also recommends several quality of life security strategies for the Tren
Urbano system and suggests a process for the continuing evaluation of its security program.
These recommendations are based on lessons learned from the case study agencies and also
from an understanding of the Tren Urbano system.
Lastly Chapter 6 highlights the findings and limitations of this research and suggests areas for
further study.
s While this evaluation criteria is not ideal, Appendix 4 discusses problems and measures to evaluate quality of life security
programs.
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Lu1seStudy Review
The chapter presents case studies of transit security in transit systems in the United States and
Latin America. The objective of this chapter is to highlight the security practices and strategies
used in the selected systems. The cases, WMATA (Washington D.C.), LACMTA (Los Angeles),
NYCT (New York City), BART (Bay Area) , and Metrovias (Buenos Aires) were selected for a
combination of reasons. The cases are all rapid rail systems which are similar in some respects to
Tren Urbano, systems where background data and security information are readily available,
systems where agency personnel are interested in security research and willing to help, and
systems with innovative security measures and techniques.
Interviews with key transit security personnel, surveys conducted by Boyd, Maier & Associates and
IEI as part of other studies, and security data from the National Transit Database have all been
used as information sources for the case studies. The interviews were conducted by telephone in
response to an open-ended questionnaire sent out earlier (See Appendix 1). The Buenos Aires
case study relies on written communication with the Chief of Security and thus follows a slightly
different format.6
For each case study, the background, the historical context of security, and the security strategies
of the transit agencies are discussed. The security strategies include the design techniques,
technology and equipment used by each case study agency, their policing and management
strategies, and their security evaluation techniques.
6 Many thanks to Adam Roman who translated this written correspondence.
2.1 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
2.1.1 Background
Created in 1968, The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) provides public
transportation for the District of Columbia, and several neighboring counties in Maryland and
Virginia. The WMATA system consists of Metrorail, which began operating in 1976, and Metrobus,
a bus network covering approximately 1,500 square miles. Metrorail is a heavy rail system with 74
stations, 89 miles of line and 764 rail cars. Nine more stations are currently under construction.
The stations of Metrorail are a mix of elevated, subway, and at grade. Metrorail averages a
weekday ridership of 508,000 trips.
2.1.2 History
Metrorail, unlike some of the older systems in the United States, had a dramatic concern for
security from its inception. From the beginning of Metrorail's operation, WMATA's security program
included an emphasis on policing and personnel practices and on advanced communication and
technology packages. The pre-construction planning process at Metrorail included the future police
chief and deputy police chief of the system (as well as architects, engineers and the Commission
on Fine Arts.) The police chief and deputy police chief had many years of experience dealing with
security and incorporated security principles into the design of the system (LaVigne, 1996, p.166).
Members of the planning team also inspected other transit agencies to derive transit security
lessons which might be applicable. For example, due to the problems other transit agencies had
with security in public toilets, no public toilets were built for the Metrorail system (Hanson, 1997).
2.1.3 Security Strategies
Table 2-1: WMATA Security Strategies
Technology and Labor Practices Physical Design Characteristics
" Communications System 0 Long Platforms
* Closed Circuit TV e High Ceilings
* Call Boxes & Hot Lines e No Winding Passage Ways (where
possible)
* Zero Tolerance Policing 0 No Public Bathrooms
e Station Attendants * Graffiti Resistant Design & Materials
* Aggressive Maintenance * Attention to Lighting
Table 2-1 highlights the transit security strategies utilized by Metrorail.
Design, Equipment, and Technoloqy
Metrorail's security design followed principles now commonly known as Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention (See Chapter 1) which were not widely
recognized by security and design professionals at the time (LaVigne, 1996, p.166). These design
strategies were incorporated throughout the entire Metro system and meshed principles of
aesthetics and security. As all of the Metro stations are uniform in design (except for differences
due to elevation) these design principles apply to all stations and include the following:
Metrorail stations are built with platforms over 600 feet long and as wide as 60 feet. On the
platform area there are very few columns and there are high, free-standing, vaulted ceilings in
underground stations. This design creates a wide-open space which makes passengers feel more
secure and also allows passengers and station attendants to observe activity occurring throughout
the platform area. This design does not leave many places for would-be criminals to hide. In
addition, winding passage ways were eliminated; lengthy escalators and stairs were created
instead to give passengers and stations managers long lines of sight. Graffiti resistant design and
materials were used in the construction of the system. Walls were set-back and bars were installed
to discourage graffiti. WMATA's early lighting design were not a success because the lighting level
was too low, but these policies were revamped in later stations (LaVigne, 1996, pp. 169-173).
Many of the design principles employed by WMATA have become standard in the construction of
new transit systems and in the rehabilitation of stations in older systems.
WMATA utilizes technology and equipment to create a secure system. WMATA's communication
system facilitates communication between the train operator and central control. Passengers are
able to contact station managers from the platforms and elevators, and operators from the end of
each rail car. The operator, the station manager and central control all have the ability to broadcast
public announcements throughout the vehicle, system, or station area. Call boxes are located
every 800 feet along the track, and there are between six and eight closed circuit TVs at every
station (LaVigne, 1996, p. 174). Passengers can also report crimes to a police and fire department
hotline.
Management and Policing
Most of WMATA's security force is focused on high visibility uniform patrols on Metrorail, although
the police do also patrol Metrobus. A sworn police force of 286 officers patrols the system using a
wide variety of policing tactics such as: random foot patrol, fixed posts, mobile patrol, canine patrol,
community oriented policing, and school outreach and patrol (Interactive Elements Inc., 1996). The
Metro Transit Police complete extensive training and a rigorous screening process as they are
responsible for knowing federal, District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia law.
Metrorail's police practice a policy known as "zero tolerance policing" which aggressively targets
quality of life offenses. For example, Metrorail's police prevent panhandlers and vagrants from
loitering on the system, and also fine individuals who eat, drink, or smoke on the system. Metro's
security personnel instituted this policy at system start-up, because they believed that cracking
down on quality of life offenses would deter other types of offenses (Hanson, 1997).
Metrorail's uniformed station attendants contribute to the security of the system by monitoring the
activity of their station area. These attendants are located in kiosks at the entrances (exits) to
stations and provide information to passengers, monitor the CCTVs throughout the station area,
and broadcast events on the public address system.
Metrorail's Evaluation Techniques
In general, Metrorail authorities are pleased with their security program, and as such do not spend
a large amount of time on security strategy and program evaluation. While they do collect and
analyze crime data, Chief Polly Hanson reports that there is not enough crime to determine
statistical trends. However the police force analyzes the time of day in which crimes occur and
number of crimes which occur on the system. WMATA has also gathered information that
demonstrates an inverse relationship between the number of crimes committed and the number of
citations written on a given day. To understand crime, WMATA police analyze the print-outs from
fare gates to determine the occurrence of fare fraud with respect to subsidies. The print outs will
allow the WMATA police to understand what types and the amount of subsidies are being used at
fare gates. They can match this information with the types and amount of subsidies they have
distributed to qualified individuals and analyze whether individuals ineligible for fare subsidies are
cheating the system.
Metrorail, like most transit agencies, does market research on passenger concerns and satisfaction
including focus groups, surveys, and a mail-in survey. This market research however is not
specifically geared towards security concerns. One interesting technique that Metrorail uses to
evaluate passenger opinion of police activity is the practice of the police commander telephoning
patrons who have recently filed a report and asking if they are satisfied with the service they
received from the police (Hanson, 1996).
2.1.4 Issues Today
Metrorail's early emphasis on security has created a security program that is still very similar to the
original plan. Quality of life issues continue to be a dominant part of Metrorail's security program
due to the belief that cracking down on quality of life crime will prevent more serious crime from
occurring. In fact one of the few changes that occurred in the twenty years of Metrorail's security
history has been a more stringent enforcement of quality of life offenses. Officers now have the
ability to ticket individuals directly when they are caught eating, drinking, or smoking (Hanson,
1996). Police officers are also currently targeting juvenile offenders, as they are a major concern of
the police.
In a recent survey Metrorail's uniformed foot patrol listed its five major concems as: fare evasion,
disorderly youths, aggressive panhandlers, enforcement of the no smoking, eating, and drinking
ordinances, and graffiti (Boyd, Maier & Associates, Transit System and Police Department
Characterization, 1995).
2.2 New York City Transit
2.2.1 Background
New York City Transit, is one of several agencies providing transit in the New York City
Metropolitan Area, under the umbrella of the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). NYCT is
responsible for providing bus and subway service (and the Staten Island Railway) to the five
boroughs of the city. NYCT operates 2,300 buses over approximately 230 routes and has the
largest subway network in the country. The New York City subway serves four boroughs, has 714
track miles, and 469 stations and is also one of the oldest systems in the country, with the first
portion being built in 1904.
2.2.2 History
NYCT historically has had many problems with security and perceived security on the subways.
Before the late 1980's, the New York City subway was in a state of disrepair and neglect that
affected the quality of life and security on the system. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, New
York's subway system was infamous for its graffiti as few inches remained graffiti-free over the
entire system. This graffiti was systematically removed in the 1980's and 1990's. The Guardian
Angels, a citizen action group, reacting to the dismal conditions on the subway, was also created in
the late 1970's to help patrol and prevent crime on the subway.
In 1990 New York City Transit developed a series of initiatives to combat quality of life crimes
spearheaded by William Bratton, who was chief of the New York City Transit Police. The program
took a long time to fully develop and implement, due in part to the depth of the problems in the
1970's and early 1980's. In 1988 NYCT tried to implement a program to attack quality of life issues
on the subway. This program did not get into gear because an unfavorable court decision, Young
v. New York City Transit Authority, which prevented the transit agency from tackling panhandling
and begging on the system (Kelling & Cole, 1996, p. 126). In addition the 1988 program was too
limited in scope and did not attack all the issues needed to improve quality of life on the subway. A
successful appeal to the Young decision occurred in 1990 enabling NYCT to be more aggressive in
attacking quality of life offenses and to remove the homeless from the subway. Much of the
problem of deterring quality of life crime in New York City was not in determining strategies, but in
developing enforcement and implementation mechanisms for these strategies(Weiss, 1997).
The quality of life initiatives launched by the transit agency were applied more broadly to New York
City in 1994 when William Bratton, became Chief of Police for the City of New York under Mayor
Giuliani. At this time the NYCT Police were merged with the New York Police Department(NYPD).
Consequently the transit division of the New York Police began to, and still follows, the same
policies and practices as the New York Police Department. Management practices in the NYPD
(and thus the transit police) were also improved by the installation of a system-wide computer
based method of crime data analysis, and by stricter recruitment standards(Anderson, 1997, p. 47).
These new initiatives have been hailed by many to be successful and provide powerful evidence of
the importance of quality of life crime in deterring more serious crime. Felonies including murder,
rape, robbery, assault, burglary, grand larceny, and auto theft in the city have declined 39 percent
since 1993 (Kraus, 1996, p. Al). For example, 984 homicides occurred in 1996 in the city of New
York, down 57 percent from the 1990 figure. While this evidence seems to suggest that attacking
quality of life crime prevents more serious crime from occurring, criminologists and theorists also
point to other causes. Other indicators to explain the decline of crime in New York City, include the
stabilization of the crack epidemic; a changing drug market that results in reduced crime; and the
decline of crime-age prone groups as part of the population (Anderson, 1997, p. 47).
2.2.3 Security Strategies
Table 2-2 summarizes the security practices of New York which will be discussed in more detail in
this section.
Table 2-2: NYCT Security Strategies
Technology and Labor Practices Physical Design Characteristics
* Merged with NYPD 0 Community Input to Rehabilitation
of old stations
* Station Manager 0 Ability to close cul de sacs and
* Systemwide Approach selected exits and entrances
* Attack on Quality of Life Offenses
* Strong Maintenance Efforts
* Extensive Market Research
Technology, Equipment and Design on the New York Subway
The physical security features of the New York City subway differ from line to line and station to
station due to the history and nature of the system. The age and massive size of the system make
the option of installing modern security equipment in all the stations prohibitive. For example, the
possibility of installing call boxes in all stations was found to be extremely costly. Instead NYCT
contracted out to NYNEX to install more telephones in the stations(Weiss, 1997).
Closed circuit televisions do not exist in every station, however the "talk back" system is installed in
about seventy stations. In this system a passenger in need of help activates a signal which notifies
the token clerk that there is a problem and focuses closed circuit televisions in the problem area.
The token clerk can then answer questions and/or contact the transit police if necessary. Closed
circuit televisions are also used in special cases to track known criminals.
The NYCT has focused energy and resources on issues of station design and re-design. For
example, NYCT investigated station paint color and found that light and bright colors are less
intimidating to patrons than dark colors. The NYCT also closed certain station exits and entrances
and created better lines of sight by closing cul de sacs. An interesting example for station design
and closing off exits and entrances occurred in Brooklyn when the NYCT closed a tunnel between
a subway and a shopping center. This tunnel was hardly used except in rainy weather. NYCT
found that crime at that station decreased 50% and that purse snatching at the shopping center
went down 25%. The closing of the passageway had cut off the criminal's escape route from the
subway station and from the shopping center(Weiss, 1997). Based on focus groups and market
research, the NYCT found that larger waiting areas and clear signage also improved passengers'
perception of security.
Management and Policing
In 1990, New York City Transit implemented a series of initiatives to combat quality of life crimes on
the subway system which is still largely followed today. Ten strategies were identified to deal with
quality of life issues, including cracking down on graffiti and fare evasion; enhanced
communications, programs and services for homelessness; and phasing out hot dog vendors.
NYCT staff also recognized that improved security had to come about in a holistic manner and
include employees from the entire system. In the 1990 effort, everyone at the transit agency from
motor operators, to token collectors, to maintenance staff were involved in the initiatives to combat
quality of life crimes. Upper management supported this initiative and were essential in spreading
the word that preventing quality of life crime was everybody's concern. Upper management held
weekly meetings on these issues, and William Bratton delivered radio addresses to the public to
communicate the importance of preventing quality of life crime (Weiss, 1997).
Strategies in combating quality of life crime, included removing the homeless from the subway and
referring them to shelters. As part of the HOPE program, the homeless were given free passage
on buses that ran to shelters. Homelessness was and still is a major concern for the transit
authority and its patrons.
NYCT also created the position of station manager to oversee the running of the each station by
keeping order, being highly visible to patrons, insisting that passengers follow the subway rules,
ensuring proper maintenance and cleaning of spills. Only large stations had their own station
manager, but many smaller stations had part-time oversight of the station area(Kelling and Cole,
1996, p. 135).
The transit authority also instituted a huge initiative to remove graffiti as soon as it occurred and
cracked down on fare evasion. When arresting people for fare evasion, the NYCT found that many
of the offenders had also committed other crimes, such as carrying guns without a license and
pickpocketing. The transit police were aggressive in attacking crime and made over 2,000 felony
arrests between July 1990 and 1993. The transit police also stopped vehicles and did searches.
(Weiss, 1997).
The transit authority worked with school groups and garnered community support for their attacks
on quality of life offenses and as a result had overwhelming public support. Community groups,
Business Improvement Districts, and community boards played an essential role in preventing
quality of life offenses and working with the NYCT police and NY police(Weiss, 1997). The transit
agency also recognized those employees who did a good job at deterring quality of life offenses.
NYCT's Security Evaluation Techniques
New York City Transit and the Metropolitan Transit Authority have more advanced techniques for
market research security evaluation than any of the other case study systems. The amount and
type of market research conducted by New York City Transit is extremely comprehensive,
including:
Annual Attitude Surveys: The MTA tracks attitudes and perceptions of passengers in an annual
survey of a random sample of 12,000 passengers. Passenger's perceptions of security are
included in this survey(Wentworth, 1996).
Transportation Panels: A diary of the travel behavior of passengers is tracked monthly and these
passengers are asked some general questions on security(Wentworth, 1996).
Station Design Studies: Passengers are asked to evaluate stations before and after rehabilitation
and community groups are asked for their input and design suggestions before station rehabilitation
occurs(Wentworth, 1996).
Policing Studies: Using pamphlets, the transit authority has also done a series of studies on the
visibility of policemen. First, when the NYCT had a non-uniformed person handing out pamphlets,
the passengers surveyed could not remember what the person who handed them pamphlets
looked like. Next, when a uniformed police officer handed out pamphlets, passenger surveyed
were able to identify that a police officer handed them the pamphlets. Third when a police officer
was standing still, passengers surveyed did not remember seeing him, and finally when the police
officer was actively handing out pamphlets, passengers remembered seeing him(Weiss, 1997).
NYCT also investigated the use of closed circuit tvs (CCTVs). Initially they had people watching
CCTVs in a special area, but they found that after a few seconds the people watching the monitors
zoned out the activity on the monitors. After that experiment, NYCT, instituted the "talk back"
system (described above) which is extremely effective in high crime areas while still using closed
circuit television to identify wanted criminals (Weiss, 1997).
2.2.4 Issues Today
Although the 1990 initiative to attack quality of life crimes in the subway has been successful in
decreasing crime, security remains a serious problem. Wally Wentworth, who conducts market
research for NYCT states, "Security is the number one barrier to off-peak ridership in our system."
Market research efforts have demonstrated that security is still a concem and transit officials are
looking for ways to improve passenger perceptions. Most recently transit officials are working on
conducting a study that would investigate how installing technology like automated vending
machines and having no fare collectors would influence patrons' perceptions of security.
2.3 Bay Area Rapid Transit
2.3.1 Background
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) serves the San Francisco and Oakland area with heavy rail and
bus service. The BART system commenced operation in 1972 and has four rail lines, several
express bus routes, large parking lots (with over 26,000 total parking spots) and a current annual
rdership of about 79 million. BART is also currently undergoing a system expansion, including an
extension to the airport. BART is only one of many transit agencies in the Bay Area others
including: Muni which operates light rail, and bus service in San Francisco; AC Transit which offers
bus service in the Alameda Corridor; and Caltrain which provides commuter rail service from San
Francisco to Gilroy via Santa Cruz.
2.3.2 History
The BART Police department was created in 1969 when the system was being built, because of
the difficulty of developing uniform police practices and techniques among the sixteen different
municipalities of the BART system. BART police began to implement their system of direct
reporting, the predecessor to the current zone policing, in 1984. BART Transit Police have also
developed a long range plan which includes the goals and objectives of the department, along with
its mission statement and history.
2.3.3 Security Strategies
Table 2-3 summarizes the technology, labor and design practices currently in use by the BART
system. These practices are discussed below.
Table 2-3: BART Security Strategies
Technology and Labor Practices Physical Design Characteristics
* Communications System 0 New Mercury Vapor Lighting
* Call boxes and CCTV at Parking
Areas and (occasionally) in 0 Police input into new and
vehicles rehabilitated stations.
* Zone Policing
. Attention to Quality of Life
Offenses
* Community Service Attendants
. Community Partnerships
. Strong Maintenance Efforts
Technology, Equipment and Design at BART
BART, like most transit agencies, uses communication systems and equipment to deter crime.
BART has an "Attendant Call Intercom" at the end of each car providing access to the Train
Operator. Emergency phones, marked with a Blue light, providing a direct line to BART control are
located in the Transbay tube, Berkeley Hills tunnel and subway areas. As part of their Security
Enhancement program, BART is in the process of changing the lighting in the parking areas from
mercury vapor to high pressure sodium (which is a yellow-orange color). BART is also in the
process of installing cellular call boxes at parking lots. While much of the BART system was built
only a few years before the construction of WMATA, the construction process did not emphasize
the techniques of crime prevention through environmental design. Currently however the police
have input into the design techniques used in the rehabilitation of old stations and in new stations.
BART does not have closed circuit televisions throughout most of the system, however they are
used in about three fourths of the parking structures (Joe, 1996). These closed circuit televisions
are monitored by the community service assistants in the parking garages. BART also places
CCTVs in the rail vehicles in which graffiti is occurring. If at the end of the day, a vehicle returns to
the maintenance yards with graffiti on it, a closed circuit tv is placed on that vehicle route to identify
those individuals who are committing graffiti(Gee, 1997).
Management and Policing
BART currently has a sworn police force of 155 officers and a 45 person civilian staff of
dispatchers, supervisors, clerks, revenue protection guards, and parking structure
attendants(BART, Long Range Plan). The BART Transit Police must complete a training process
that meets the Peace Officer Standards and Training of California.
The BART Transit Police currently employ a practice known as 'zone policing". This policy,
instituted in 1994, created zone facilities at 4 station areas, to which transit police report to at the
start and end of their duty, rather than to headquarters. A computerized system is (or will be) in
place that will connect these zone precincts to headquarters(BART, Long Range Plan). Officers
are stationed at a zone for at least six months and then may chose to relocate to another zone.
Many officers do not chose to relocate, because they are close to home and/or have knowledge of
the area and the constituents (Gee, 1997). This practice has greatly reduced the travel time for
police officers, allows police officers to gain better knowledge of the community, creates a
significant police presence at the zone facilities, and provides better access to the transit police for
community groups and members (Joe, 1996).
BART's police force attacks quality of life crimes such as eating, drinking, smoking, on the system
and also works on issues of homelessness and vagrancy. The transit police work with a group of
social service providers and city social workers in a program known as MATRIX to refer transients
to shelters and social welfare agencies.
BART police also conduct the following types of patrol: random foot patrol, train/bus patrol, mobile
response patrol, and canine patrol (Interactive Elements Inc., 1996). BART has phased out most
of its undercover patrols and replaced them with more uniformed and visible patrols. This shift
occurred because undercover policemen did very little to deter quality of life crimes; customers
complained that they did not see enough policemen; and BART's policing strategy stems from a
belief that uniformed visible police officers serve to deter crime (Gee, 1997).
Another policing strategy that is currently under development is a new classification of police
officers, known as community assistants. These community assistants do not have police powers,
but are able to watch for quality of life offenses, monitor closed circuit TV's at parking lots, assist
passengers to their cars at parking lots, and provide a potential labor pool for BART's transit police
force(BART, Long Range Plan).
BART's maintenance force also conducts routine maintenance to clear the system of graffiti, and
system services and custodians are encouraged to be in touch with the police (Joe, 1996). In
addition, upper management takes a proactive role in security and passenger concerns. The
previous general manager of the system used to hold weekly meetings where he would meet and
talk with patrons and discuss their concerns.
BART also does extensive community outreach and uses partnerships with other groups to help
improve the security of its transit areas. BART received a $150,000 Community Block Grant to
work in partnerships with other groups. For example, BART police jointly operate police kiosks with
the San Francisco and University of California Police. The BART police helped supply radios and
uniforms to the University of Berkeley's police department. Berkeley's Police department escorts
patrons from BART stations near Berkeley's campus. The MATRIX program and zone policing
(described above) also require BART to work closely with other agencies and community groups
(Joe, 1996).
BART's Evaluation Techniques
The development of a Security Enhancement Program and a -long range plan of goals and
objectives by the BART Transit Police has enabled them to develop a process by which they can
evaluate their security program and procedures.
BART transit police conduct market research on a regular basis to evaluate passenger perceptions
of security. In 1995, the BART transit police completed a crime perception survey. The purpose of
this survey was: to create a baseline for follow-up surveys (the next survey is scheduled for 1997);
to evaluate current patron perceptions of BART security; and to evaluate security by geographic
location, age group and time of travel (Crime Perception Survey Highlights, 19951. BART transit
police telephoned riders who filled out the 1992 Passenger Profile and asked them questions about
their perceptions of security on the vehicle and at their normal exit and entry stations. These
questions were pre-tested and developed with input from several departments and with the help of
a market research consultant. BART completed 1,364 questionnaires which included the
responses of 160 elderly as well as 307 night riders. Surveys were weighted to match the 1992
Passenger Profile survey.
The BART transit police track Calls For Service from patrons, station attendants, or anyone else
who calls about a Quality of Life violation. They also track officer initiated contacts with the
homeless and vagrant population. A crime analyst inputs and analyzes these and other crime
statistics in a database and publishes monthly reports on crime trends.
2.3.4 Issues Today
BART has spent the last three years conducting a $4.5 million Security Enhancement Program,
funded by the Board of Directors with three primary goals:
* Decentralizing the police force using "zone policing"
. Improving lighting at stations (especially those with parking)
" Installing call boxes at parking lots
To date BART has been fairly successful in implementing these short term goals; zone policing has
been implemented, improved lighting has been installed, and call boxes will soon be placed in
parking lots (Gee, 1997). The success of these short term solutions on the perceived and actual
security of the BART system have yet to be determined.
2.4 Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportaion Authority
2.4.1 Background
The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) is a regional agency that
was created in 1993 by the merger of two government agencies the Los Angeles County
Transportation Commission and the Southern California Rapid Transit District. LACMTA oversees
the regional bus and rail operations, the planning and construction of a countywide rail system, and
coordinates transportation programs in the region. The regional bus system, Metrobus operates
more than 2,300 buses for 1.2 million riders. Since the 1980's LACMTA has commenced
construction of a rail system with the Green, Red, and Blue Lines. Metro Red Line, which opened in
January 1993, is a 4.4 mile heavy rail line that serves downtown Los Angeles and 5.8 million riders
annually; the Metro Blue Line, which opened in 1990, is a 22 mile long light rail line between Los
Angeles and Long Beach; and the Metro Green Line, opened in late 1995, is a 20-mile 14-station
light rail line, from Norwalk to El Segundo. LACMTA is continuing to expand this system with Red
Line extensions to North Hollywood and to Whitter Atlantic and a Blue line extension from Union
Station to Sierra Madre Villa.
2.4.2 History
When the Blue Line in Los Angeles commenced operation in 1990, LACMTA placed a huge
emphasis on transit security and hired many security guards. Prior to the Blue Line's construction,
a committee with representatives from the law enforcement agencies in the area, transit police and
consultants met to discuss the security issues of the Blue Line and implemented many physical
design and security measures. As the Blue Line was the first line to be constructed, the Green and
Red Lines followed similar security concepts. The first year security costs of the Blue Line services
was $12 million, and the sheriff's department which was in charge of the transit policing at this time,
utilized 136 positions, a 123 of these sworn deputy personnel for the line (Hubaud, 1992, p. 313).
This ratio of personnel to riders was approximately one deputy per every 75 to 150 riders. (At the
time the countywide ratio was one officer to 500 inhabitants). Similarly when the Red Line opened
in 1993, there were 45 officers patrolling the Red Line at a cost of $3.8 million a year. This amount
is one officer for every 75 passengers in rush hour, and one officer for every 35 off peak
passengers (Rofe, 1993, p. A-3). Due to these extreme and costly security measures, LACMTA
received a fair amount of negative press.
In 1994 the MTA won the contract to operate security services from the sheriff's office and in the
last two years, the personnel working the Blue Line have decreased dramatically. Currently on the
Blue Line, in both the a.m. and p.m. shifts 2 sergeants and eighteen officers patrol the area-with
more officers in the high crime areas(Conte, 1997). Moreover, there are plans for the Los Angeles
Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to gain joint control over the
policing of the bus and rail systems. The MTA's police would merge with these two forces, but the
MTA would still finance the operations(Lichtblau and Simon, 1996, p. B1).
2.4.3 Securty Strategies
Table 2-4 summarizes LACMTA's security policies and strategies.
Table 2-4: LACMTA Security Strategies
Technology and Labor Practices Physical Design Characteristics
* Communications System . Barrier Free System
. Closed Circuit TV e Landscaping
* Call Boxes . Fencing
* Sensors * Adequate Lighting
* Attention to Quality of Life . Graffiti Resistant Design &
Offenses Materials
* Matching number of police at
specific stations to crime rates at
station
Design, Equipment and Technoloqy:
As the rail system of Los Angeles is newly constructed, the system uses modern construction and
equipment including; closed circuit tv, emergency telephones at each station, intercoms on the
train, and graffiti and vandalism resistant materials. LACMTA also installed a facility intrusion
detection system, with sensors that are monitored at the central control facility by control personnel.
Landscaping is designed to create long lines of sight and does not provide anywhere for would-be
criminals to hide; fences have also been installed along the right of way (Hubaud, 1992, pp. 312-
319).
One of the security problems facing the system is that it is barrier free: tickets are purchased from
self-service machines and there is no barrier between paid and unpaid areas (Conte, 1997).
Without a barrier between passengers and non passengers, it can be harder for the police to patrol
an area and to protect the passengers from would-be offenders.
Policing and Management
LACMTA currently has the largest transit police force in the country with about 425 sworn transit
police, 80 contracted security and 59 MTA security guards (Interactive Elements Inc., 1996). The
MTA contracts out with private security personnel to guard the Park & Rides. The "sworn transit'
police force has faced budget cuts and reductions in the last couple of years. Police utilize a
mixture of random foot patrol, uniformed patrol, mobile patrol responding, and special project units
to combat crime (Interactive Elements Inc., 1996). The transit police enforce the quality of life
regulations, that are spelled out in the penal code of California.
None of the rail lines in Los Angeles utilize a fare collector at the station or a station manger. For all
three lines, the police force carries out the fare inspection duties; thus the only personnel visible on
the platform area are the MTA police. Personnel at a control center monitor the closed circuit
televisions off -site and notify police when they observe a disturbance on the monitor.
LACMTA's Evaluation Techniques
LACMTA tracks crime trends over each three month time period. If increasing crime trends are
noted at a certain station or area, then more officers are deployed in that area until crime
decreases. Of course, more officers deployed in one area results in fewer officers being deployed
elsewhere. All incidents are reported in an incident report; a data entry clerk enters the reports in a
computer system, and a crime analyst analyzes the monthly reports by tracking crimes occurring by
stations, platforms, and type.
These reports also track the number of police inspections for proper payment of fare. For example,
in October 1994, the transit police inspected approximately 305,718 passengers or 33.5% of the
monthly ridership for proper payment of fare. They issued approximately 571 fare related citations
for this month(LACMTA, 1994, p. 1).
LACMTA also recently completed a major cost study on their security and policing program.
2.4.4 Issues Today
LACMTA like many transit agencies is concerned with car theft, trespassing, fare evasion,
vandalism, and graffiti . In a recent survey LACMTA ranked the following offenses as most
important in terms of police/security time and resources on the rail system: assaults on
passengers, fare evasion, vandalism, smoking, eating, loud music, and trespassing (Boyd, Maier &
Associates, Transit System and Police Department Characterization, 1995).
2.5 Metrovias'
2.5.1 Background
The SUBTE system serves the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, Argentina with six subway lines
and one commuter rail line. In 1993, Metrovias was awarded a concession to operate the subway
system of Buenos Aires as the only privatized subway system in South America. In 1993, the
government of Argentina also privatized the commuter rail systems, and the rail freight network
(Carbajo and Estache, 1996, p. 1). Since the creation of Metrovias, average train headways have
decreased to less than three minutes and annual ridership has increased 30 to 40% to 190
million/year (McKay, 1996, p. 3).
2.5.2 Privatization effects on Metrovias' security program
The privatization of Argentina's subways greatly impacted the security program and operations of
the system. The private operators brought in new operating practices and personnel. Currently
Metrovias operates with two types of security forces which work closely together; a private security
force of twenty five people and a public police force. The Argentinean state and Metrovias signed a
licensed contract that reserves the right of the state to control the public security of the subway
system (Guitian, 1997).
Privatization also influences the philosophy of the transit system managers towards transit security.
The current Chief of Security, Roberto Guitian believes that a private company has a more
restrictive situation on budgeting than a public agency due to its concern with tangible profits. He
explains the paradox of security and budgeting; --"If the security program is efficient, and the
incidents of crime are very low, they [the managers] ask themselves, 'If there are so few crimes,
why am I spending so much?' If the security program reflects many incidents of crime, they [the
managers] ask themselves, 'Why do I spend so much money if the security program does not
work?' " (1997).
7 Due to the fact that the research for Buenos Aires, Argentina was conducted via written correspondence instead of phone
interview, the amount and type of information I obtained was different from that of the United States case studies. Thus this
case study differs in content and style from those for the United States.
Before privatization, the Subway Supervisors controlled and managed the police who patrolled the
subway. According to Guitian, this system did not work effectively because many of the
supervisors were ex-military and ex policemen, and the police resented their control. In 1995 with
the installation of private police/guard forces, Guitian restructured the system, introduced the
concept of security programs, and reduced the number of guards required.
2.5.3 Security Features at Metrovias
Currently Metrovias is undergoing physical and technical renovation. The first part of the subway
system was created in 1913, but maintenance efforts were largely abandoned in the 1960s. New
investment in these stations focuses on installing underground stores in the stations and equipping
the stations so that they can be evacuated in emergencies. In addition to replacing the older red
telephones in the system, Metrovias is installing a fiber optic circuit that will permit direct
communication between fixed telephone lines and portable radio-electric equipment. The fiber
optic circuit will also be able to transmit images via a CCTV network, which was installed in 1995.
Automatic ticket machines will be installed, but like the Washington D.C. Metro, Metrovias will
continue to utilize a station manager to control the station, centralize maintenance and cleanup
requests, and supervise passenger interaction (Guitian, 1997).
Uniformed security guards are responsible for enforcing the law and internal policies of Metrovias.
They contact police when needed. Recently these uniformed security guards have been given the
power to enforce "quality of life" laws designed to discourage activities such as smoking, drug use,
and littering. However while acting in a drunken manner is prohibited, alcohol is allowed due to the
fact that there are bars and cafeterias in the transit stations that legally sell alcohol (Guitian, 1997).
The supervisors and the local police are dressed in plainclothes and deal with minor infractions in
the metro system. A "prevention squadron" of plain clothes local police prevent minor infractions of
the system such as homelessness and unauthorized salesmen.
Metrovias faces crimes and offenses similar to agencies within the United States. The three top
criminal offenses that face Metrovias are: being held up and robbed; breaking, entering and
vandalism; and burglary (of items). Metrovias' three top minor offenses include fare evasion,
panhandling, and littering(Guitian, 1997).
Table 2-5: Metrovias Security Strategies
Similarity to U.S. Case Studies Differences with U.S. Case Studies
* Uniformed and Plainclothes * Privatized Franchise Operator
security personnel
* Resources allocated to similar * Concessions serving alcohol
types of offenses allowed in the stations.
* Modem technology (i.e. use of
CCTV, and automatic ticket
gates.)
* Concern for Quality of Life
Offenses
Table 2-5 demonstrates that Metrovias shares many security concerns and strategies with its
United States counterparts. Two major differences between Metrovias and the transit agencies in
the United States are the use of concessions and privatization. The use of concessions by
Metrovias illustrates an important cultural difference between the United States and Latin America
and is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The fact that Metrovias is a private franchise
operator does affect its security program and the way in which the security personnel interact with
the public police force. Metrovias' security program and operations have benefited from
privatization of the transit system and the case study offers insight into the way in which the
franchising of a system can influence transit security. 8
8 Chapter 5 discusses some of the issues of contracting out and the role of the private and public sectors in the construction
and management of the Tren Urbano system in San Juan.
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ujulity of Life Strategies; Options and Choices
All of the case study agencies have made decisions about the use of several important quality of
life strategies. This chapter highlights five important areas for potential quality of life security
strategies; Ordinances Regulating Quality of Life Crime, Concessions, Management Options,
Closed Circuit Televisions, and Design Issues. These areas were selected because they are
important to transit agencies and quality of life security. Each area is discussed below; first in terms
of the various approaches the case study agencies have taken towards each area; and then an
approach is recommended.
3.1 Ordinances Regulating Quality of Life Crimes
Legislative mandates that define and prohibit certain offenses, such as smoking and drinking on
transit systems are known as "quality of life ordinances". Many transit systems in the United States
have ordinances that regulate quality of life offenses commonly including: disorderly conduct,
homelessness/vagrancy, drunkenness, liquor law violations, smoking/eating/drinking /littering/loud
music, public urination, fare evasion, and graffiti. This section describes the creation and content of
these ordinances and discusses the role they play in transit security.
Creating the Ordinance
Quality of Life Ordinances can be created in two ways. In the first and most common case, the
state creates a section in the state code (usually the penal or criminal code) that applies specifically
to infractions on public transportation systems. For example, California's penal code refers to "Acts
committed on facilities or vehicles of public or subsidized public transportation systems". 9 (A public
transportation system is defined in the Public Utilities Code). The Public Utilities Code or Motor
Vehicle Code may create distinctions between cities or types of transit (for example, Pennsylvania's
9 California's Penal Code Part 1, Title 2, Chapter 2 4 640
motor vehicle code refers to class 1 and class 2 cities) so regulations do not to apply to all transit
systems in the state (Korach, 1997).
When the quality of life ordinance is incorporated into the penal code, the transit agency does not
have the legislative ability to create laws regulating quality of life offenses and is governed by the
state. Almost all transit agencies in the United States are state entities as they often cross
numerous jurisdictions within a state. The transit agency does not have the capacity to offer due
process to those who have committed a quality of life infraction, so an outside body (such as a
state court) is needed to adjudicate these proceedings (Korach, 1997).
Of the case study systems, both BART and LACMTA are subject to certain provisions in
California's penal code. WMATA is subject to two different portions of the District of Columbia's
code: Title 44, Railroads and Other Carriers, Chapter 2. Street Railways and Bus Lines of the D.C.
Code, and Title 22 Criminal Offenses, Chapter 33A Panhandlinq Control. (See Appendix 2 for
California's Penal Code applicable to quality of life offenses, and Appendix 3 for the sections of the
D.C. Code regulating behavior in the Washington D.C. system.)
In other cases, such as New York City Transit (and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit
Operating Authority), the state legislature has created a provision, Sections 1203-a(3) and 1204-5a
of the Public Authorities Law that provides the transit authority "with power to make rules governing
the conduct and safety of the public in the use and operations of the transit facilities of those
authorities." These rules are documented in New York City Transit's Rules of Conduct.
In the New York City case, the transit agency can create specific rules, modify these rules as they
see fit, and is responsible for adjudicating fines and penalties. A Transit Adjudication Bureau
regulates the "application, implementation, and modification of these fine and penalty schedules."
(NYCT, p. 5).
Content
All of the ordinances and codes applicable to the case study systems regulate activities such as
eating, drinking, smoking, graffiti, urinating on the system, skateboarding or rollerblading, blocking
free movement in the system, disorderly conduct, and more.(See Appendices 2 and 3 for codes
and the offenses they regulate). However, due to differences in the political climate of a state or
region, or to differences in state constitutions, the ordinances used by the transit agencies to
regulate quality of life offenses differ in degree and specificity. As legal battles are being constantly
fought, these codes need to be carefully crafted, so that they do not deny the homeless or other
groups their first amendment rights.
For example, the sections of the penal code regulating quality of life violations on transit agencies in
California do not refer to panhandling or vagrancy. In contrast Title 22: Criminal Offenses, Chapter
33A : Panhandling Control of the D.C. code states "No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms in any
public transportation vehicle; or at any bus, train, or subway station or stop. " The New York City
Transit Rules of Conduct includes a similar provision-"No person shall panhandle or beg upon
any facility or conveyance."
The penalties that these codes decree generally include a fine or community service. These
penalties also differ in strength from state to state. For example, in New York City a fine between
$25 and $100 per violation is imposed on violators. In contrast, in California, the penal code
stipulates that the penalty for violating these offenses includes a fine that cannot exceed $250 and
"community service not to exceed 30 days."
Implications for Security
The case study transit agencies (WMATA, NYCT, LACMTA, and BART) all use quality of life
ordinances to punish those individuals who commit quality of life violations. For example, WMATA,
which utilizes a policy of "zero tolerance policing", relies on ordinances to give teeth to this policy
and writes a large number of citations each month. Without these ordinances and the ability to
ticket violators, transit agencies would have difficulty enforcing the regulations preventing quality of
Iife offenses. These codes also set a standard for acceptable forms of behavior in public space
and work towards creating a sense of order that make citizens feel more secure on public transit.
3.2 Concessions
Concessions are places in the vicinity of the station area where items such as flowers, food, and
newspapers are sold. In recent years transit agencies have also added services like automatic
teller machines and Federal Express mini centers to these areas. These concessions can be
located in four different areas;
1. Directly outside the station area on the street level.
2. In large intermodal stations that serve as mixed-used commercial developments. Many transit
agencies may have restaurants, food courts, shops, and day care centers in larger intermodal
stations (such as Union Station in Washington D.C.). At these stations mixed used
commercial activity is usually separate from the waiting and platform area for rapid rail.
3. Large stations with concessions in the station and mezzanine area, but not on the platform or
in the paid area, and
4. Concessions at the platform level.
All of the case study agencies have concessions directly outside the station area and in large
intermodal stations. Many transit agencies do, in fact, believe that concessions in these areas can
create a sense of place and deter crime. For example, when the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey began to renovate their crime ridden bus terminal, they decided to invest strategically in
retail activity, and actively recruited chain retailers so that patrons would feel more secure (Felson
et al, 1996, pp. 34-38).
Transit agencies are divided on whether concessions in the station area and on the platforms deter
quality of life crime and improve passenger perceptions of transit security. Several transit agencies
expressed the concern that concessions result in increased litter and contribute to the disorder of
the transit system. Transit agencies crack down on quality of life crime because they are trying to
prevent this disorder. Transit agencies also stated the concern that allowing concessions which
sell food in the station area would be counterproductive to quality of life regulations that prohibit
eating and drinking in the stations or on the train. One transit security person believed that the
activity of concessionaires would not improve people's perceptions of security and that the
presence of uniformed personnel would be more effective in improving passengers perceptions of
security.
Table 3-1 summarizes the concession policies of the case study agencies.
Table 3-1; The Use of Concessions
NYCT Phased out hot dog vendors beginning in 1990; still allow
"newspaper stands" in platform areas.
WMATA Does not allow concessions in the station area believing that they
have a detrimental effect on quality of life in the station. Is now
considering introducing concessions for financial reasons only.
BART Hot dog stands only form of concessions; except in a few stations
with ATM, FedEx areas.
LACMTA Does not allow concessions at all; but does have food courts
upstairs such as at Union Station.
Metrovias Large number of concessions in the station areas; including
cafeterias and bars that sell alcohol; current capital investment
program underway to create new and renovated spaces for
concessionaires and stores.
NYCT, one of the case study agencies which allows limited concessions, conducted market
research on the effects of concessions on passengers perceptions of security. They found that
concessions made people feel more secure, because the concessions brought extra activity to the
station area and led to more eyes watching the station. Concession owners and operators have a
vested interest in keeping the stations secure. However when NYCT commenced its initiatives to
prevent quality of life crime in 1990's, they phased out hot dog vendors due to the belief that these
stands increased litter and increased crime. Currently, NYCT allows concessions, such as
newspaper stands, but does not allow hot dog vendors on the platform level.
NYCT is currently trying to increase the number of concessions in the stations for economic
reasons, but stated that concessions need a fair volume of traffic to be economically viable.
Similarly, Washington Metro, which has never allowed concessions in the stations due to the belief
that concessions create litter and other quality of life crimes, is investigating installing them to
generate revenue.
Metrovias, in contrast to the case studies in the United States, has a large number of concessions
throughout the system including cafes and restaurants that sell alcohol. They are currently
improving areas in the station for concessions and shops.
There is a large difference between allowing concessionaire activity in the station mezzanine area
and in the platform area especially if there is a barrier between paid and unpaid areas. If
concessions are located in the station and mezzanine area, the concessionaires and the transit
agency can keep the area clean by installing trash cans and hiring maintenance workers to clean
up the area, especially during rush hour.10 While these procedures to control litter can also work at
the platform level, if passengers are eating and drinking on the platform level, they will eat and drink
in the vehicle. Eating and drinking in the vehicles are more likely to result in litter in the vehicle.
Allowing concessions in the platform area also results in increased need for maintenance and
cleaning of the vehicles. In addition, the location of concessions on the platform level and
mezzanine level need to be carefully designated so as not to impede the flow of passenger traffic
and to create accidents between passengers.
Assuming that the concessions are in the appropriate physical location, the following strategies can
minimize the disorder of concessions:
* Develop a no littering campaign
" Utilize vigilant maintenance in the platform and station areas to clean up litter; install plenty of
trash receptacles
* Fine individuals who litter
10 An observation at Government Center Station in Boston demonstrated that the concessions at the platform level did
contribute to many people eating and drinking on the platform area and in the vehicles. However, a cleaner on duty , many
trash cans, and Bostonians willingness to use the trash cans contributed to a clean and non-littered platform area.
To achieve some of the financial and security benefits of concessions, transit agencies should:
e Require that the concessionaires both on the mezzanine and platform level contribute to the
clean up of the station area.
. Require that concessionaires be open during off peak hours to obtain the security benefits of
the concessionaires
* Utilize chain retailers to make passengers feel more secure.
e Train the concessionaires on the correct response to different types of security problems,
including whom to alert and contact if they notice a security problem.
If these policies are implemented, then concessions in the platform area and mezzanine level can
contribute both to the security and comfort of the passenger and to the financial well being of the
transit agency.
3.3 Management Options
Different types of personnel perform various functions to ensure a secure transit system. Some of
these personnel are directly responsible for the security of the system, such as transit police or
security guards, while other "non-security" personnel such as maintenance crews work to improve
the quality of life in the system and to remove disorder. This distinction can become blurred as
agencies use a hybrid of positions and options to maintain order in the system. Table 3-2
describes the various types of personnel utilized by transit agencies to maintain an orderly and
secure system:
Table 3-2: The Use of Personnel
Transit Agency: Type of Security Personnel Type of Non Security
Personnel
LACMTA Sworn MTA transit police force Maintenance workers
Contracted Security Guards
In-House Security Guards
WMATA Sworn Transit Police force Station Agent
Maintenance Workers
BART Sworn Transit Police Maintenance Workers
Community Service Assistants Station Agent
NYCT NYPD Station Manager
Token Clerk
Maintenance Workers
Metrovias Security Guards in conjunction Maintenance Workers
with local transit police I
Security Personnel
There are several types of transit security personnel. Sworn transit police have police powers to
arrest, have received the same training as state police, and have been authorized by state and
local governments. These sworn transit police are managed and funded by the transit agency.
Transit agencies can also contract out the security of the transit system to the local police force or
municipality. In this situation the transit agency may (or may not) be paying the local police force for
this service, but would not actually be managing the police force. These management decisions
are not static however; both Los Angeles and New York City have switched between using a local
police force and a transit police force. Contracting out to a local police force or relying on a local
police force is a process that can become complicated if there are many different municipalities and
police forces in the jurisdiction of the transit agency.
Transit security agencies can also contract out to private security guards. In this instance the
security guards serve many of the same functions as police but do not have police powers. These
security guards may be given extended powers to detain and fine individuals. For example Metro
Dade Transit Authority in Miami (Florida) uses the Wackenhut Security forces to patrol their transit
system. These security guards have to contact the local police and work in partnership with them
when more serious crimes and incidents occur. (Again, coordination with local police may become
difficult when many municipalities are involved). Most transit agencies also utilize security guards to
monitor facilities such as maintenance centers and administrative offices of the transit agency.
Another hybrid option is to create positions like BART's community service assistants to advise
patrons, monitor closed circuit televisions and contact the transit police if necessary. They may
also provide a potential labor pool for future transit police.
In situations where the operations of the transit agency may be privatized (see Metrovias and
Chapter 5: Strategies for San Juan.), the private contractor may utilize its own private security force
which will work in partnership with the transportation authority's public police force. The authorities'
public police force may or may not be the same as the local public police force.
Non-Security Personnel
At many transit agencies station agents can serve many security functions; they can monitor the
closed circuit tv within the station control booth, direct patrons and offer them information, and
supervise maintenance efforts within the station. Some of these responsibilities are filled in
different agencies by a token clerk or by a station manager. Systems like New York City which do
not have automated fare collection may have token clerks who are responsible for overseeing fare
collection activities and a station manager responsible for overseeing and maintaining order in the
station. The station manager position does not always have to be full time and may be used only in
large stations. However the station agent sitting in a booth serves a different role to deter crime
than a security personnel who is actively patrolling an area to prevent crime.
Maintenance workers who rigorously clean graffiti as soon as it occurs as well as remove litter and
trash from the station area also serve to promote order in the system. Operators of the vehicles
and the doormen (utilized by some transit agencies to make sure that vehicle doors do not shut on
passengers) also help create a secure transit system, and may be especially important in
maintaining vehicle security. Other agency employees, such as supervisors, can also affect the
security practices and policies of the transit agency. Community groups may also patrol the system
or work with the transit agency to "Adopt a Station" to help maintain and create order in the system.
Types of Policing
Security personnel may perform different types of policing activities, from undercover policing to
uniformed patrol." To prevent quality of life crimes, it is important that security personnel
concentrate on order maintenance by making sure that the station is orderly, that quality of life
ordinances are obeyed, and that crimes like fare evasion do not occur. Transit agencies should
emphasize "community policing" in which security personnel are assigned to patrol on foot certain
stations and gain knowledge of a certain area and individuals. Community policing in transit
agencies also requires training transit security personnel in ways to deal with the homeless. The
homeless and programs to refer the homeless to shelters are often important issues for many
1 A TCRP study currently underway is investigating the effectiveness of uniformed vs. non-uniformed security personnel
transit agencies. This type of community policing has worked very effectively in San Francisco.
Security personnel should be in uniform as a visible presence to deter quality of life crimes. The
security personnel monitoring the station area should have the power to fine and detain individuals
who violate quality of life ordinances.
The central issue in deciding which type of security management and personnel to utilize is cost
effectiveness. Studies have demonstrated that extra police do deter crime, but the cost for this
deterred crime may be extremely high.12 Privatized security guards are often cheaper than "sworn
transit police" because transit police require extensive and lengthy training and security guards do
not.
Security guards may also have the ability to fulfill other functions such as providing information to
passengers, ensuring the system is maintained ,and monitoring CCTVs. Conversely station agents
may be able to provide some of the security functions of the security guards. However there is a
distinction between the two roles as defined here. Station agents are usually located in one
station, provide information at a set place, and monitor CCTVs in their areas. The security guard is
more likely to patrol a wider and more diverse area in the system to crack down on quality of life
offenses. The training for these two positions differ as well.1  Due to the importance of creating the
perception and the reality of a secure transit environment and lack of research in this area, the
following recommendations have thus separated these functions into two separate positions.
The following are suggestions for an effective quality of life security management strategy for a
transit agency:
12 For example, a study entitled The Impact of Police Activity and Clmes: Robbenies in the New Yolk City Subway System
investigated the ability of increased police to deter subway robberies. In April 1965, Robert Wagner increased the transit
police force from 1200 to 3100 men. These extra transit police patrolled the subway from 8:00p.m. to 4:00a.m. and
robberies during these evening hours decreased and remained at a decreased level for the eight years of the study. As
robberies increased at other times of the day, the authors demonstrated that the extra patrol contributed to the decrease in
robberies during the evening hours. The cost of this extra police patrol was expensive at $35,000 per deterred felony in
1974. (Chaiken et al.).
13 Potentially these two positions could be linked with station agents serving as a labor pool for security guards. This
approach is similar to BART use of "community service assistants" as a hiring pool for their police force.
* Utilize private security guards who are trained carefully to maintain order-including methods
on how to refer the homeless to shelters. These private security guards should be uniformed,
patrol the station areas on foot, become familiar with transit passengers and residents of the
neighborhood, and have the ability of detain individuals until police arrive and to fine and ticket
individuals who commit quality of life offenses.
* These private security guards should work in close partnership with the local police, the station
agent, community groups, social workers, and maintenance personnel to create a secure
transit environment.
" Transit agencies should utilize station agents to manage the station area by monitoring the
closed circuit televisions, providing information to patrons, and ensuring maintenance of the
system.
" Maintenance workers should provide aggressive maintenance to create a clean graffiti-free
system.
3.4 Closed Circuit Televisions
Most transit agencies in the United States use closed circuit television (CCTV) in one form or
another, as do many other companies and agencies concerned about security. Closed circuit
televisions can record or transmit visual images from one location to another and transit agencies
use them to monitor transit station areas or other facilities.
Transit agencies and criminal experts have different philosophies about the rationale for and the
importance of CCTV. CCTV might serve simply as a deterrent. Individuals aware of the CCTV
may be fearful that someone is watching them and may be deterred from committing an offense.
In addition, other people may feel safer knowing that CCTVs are installed and someone could be
watching the environment for criminal activity. However one study asked men and women to
describe their changes in perception at a transit station due to the installation of a CCTV. In
general men felt somewhat less secure, because it raised the issue of security which they had not
previously thought about. In contrast, women felt safer as a result of the CCTV installation
(Richards and Hoel, 1980 pp. 34-36).
Table 3-3 describes the use of CCTV by the case study agencies:
Table 3-3: The Use of CCTV
NYCT Limited use of CCTV with the call back system in high crime
areas, and videotapes for wanted criminals.
WMATA CCTV in many locations throughout the station area; monitored by
the station manger. (Cameras at each platform, elevators, exits
and entrances-six to eight cameras in each station).
BART Currently installing CCTV in parking areas only. CCTV watched
by community service attendants. Limited use of covert CCTVs
on vehicles traversing routes where graffiti occurs to attempt to
catch graffiti artists.
LACMTA Many CCTVs located throughout station area; monitored by
personnel in a central control center. (Cameras located on the
platform, by the fare vending machines, and in other designated
areas).
Metrovias Installing CCTVs in 1995; CCTV will be able transmit images via
new fiber-optic network currently underdevelopment.
Often transit agencies install CCTV in a station area and then monitor the result either at the station
booth or at a remote control center. Several monitors may display the transmissions of the camera
simultaneously, or a single monitor may randomly or systematically rotate the transmissions of
different cameras in a station area. Transit agencies may record the transmissions of the cameras
on video recorders or have personnel monitor the events as they occur. The recorded events can
then be used to apprehend criminals.
The number of cameras installed in a station area can range up to six or eight cameras depending
on the transit agency and the type of stations. Most of the newer transit systems have a complete
network of cameras in the station area. For example Washington D.C. has cameras located in the
platform area, by the ticket vending machines, and by the exits and entrances to the stations. In
contrast some of the older systems like NYCT and BART have decided to only install CCTVs in a
few strategic locations, such as parking lots or isolated stations.
The way in which personnel monitor the CCTV also varies from transit agency to transit agency. In
the Washington Metro station agents are responsible for observing the CCTV monitors. While
monitoring the CCTVs is not their only responsibility, the station agents use CCTVs to deter quality
of life crimes. When the station managers observe (via the CCTV) passengers eating or drinking
in the platform or waiting areas, they make public announcements to stop it. This same type of
public announcement may not be possible when the personnel monitoring the CCTVs are located
in a centralized remote area. For example in the Los Angeles transit system, personnel in a
central control room monitor the CCTVs and notify police when a disturbance occurs. (The station
managers in DC also notify the police when a disturbance occurs.) When personnel in a control
center are solely responsible for watching numerous CCTVs over the system, there is a danger
that these personnel become oblivious to the activity on the monitors. New York City Transit
Authority conducted a very limited experiment, in which they installed CCTVs in selected areas, and
had personnel monitor them in a remote location. They found that after a few seconds the
personnel did not have the ability to focus on the activity occurring on the monitors.
NYCT does not have CCTVs in every station, however it has installed the "talk back" system in
about seventy stations, either in isolated or high crime locations. In this system a passenger in
need of help activates a signal which notifies the token clerk that there is a problem. The signal
focuses the camera on the problem area. The token clerk can observe via the monitor the activity
in the problem area, answer questions and/or contact the transit police if necessary. NYCT also
uses closed circuit cameras in special cases to identify and track known criminals.
Like New York City Transit, BART only uses CCTVs occasionally. They have recently installed
CCTVs in parking lots where community service attendants monitor them. BART's use of the
CCTVs resulted in a legal settlement in which BART must now post a disclaimer under the CCTV
that the CTTV does not actually prevent crime from occurring and that the CCTV may not be able
to stop the crime.
BART also uses covert CCTV. Unlike overt CCTV where the offender is aware of its existence,
transit agencies use covert CCTV so that the offender will be unaware that he/she is being
monitored. Covert CCTV can record offenders in action, and the VCR recording can be used to
identify and prosecute criminals. BART places CCTVs in rail vehicles that have been subject to
graffiti. If at the end of the day, a vehicle returns to the maintenance yards with graffiti on it, a
camera is placed on that vehicle route to monitor for perpetrators(Gee, 1997).
CCTV involves both capital and operating costs. The capital costs of installing a closed circuit
system vary, depending on the type and amount of equipment and cameras utilized. In general
however these capital costs are relatively low. Installing a single black and white CCTV with
recording capability and monitor costs about $1500. A subsystem of about eight color stationary
cameras with a monitor for each camera costs about $14,000 to install. The price to connect each
of these subsystems to the main operating control center ranges between $3,000-$8,000.
Operating costs for the system include the personnel to monitor the CCTVs, both at the station and
off-site. The CCTVs also need to be inspected at least once a year for preventative maintenance.
If a transit agency decides to install a CCTV system, they should install an extensive network of
cameras. Each additional camera has a relatively low capital cost and individuals can observe
more than one monitor at a time.
However the transit agency should realize that CCTV is not the key to crime prevention. They must
realize that monitoring the CCTV can be expensive and potentially ineffective as those monitoring
the CCTV will have difficulty staying alert and focused. A more effective approach involves a
targeted use of CCTVs, where a passenger alarm will alert the station agent to focus on the
monitor displaying the troubled area. The station agent can then provide information or summon
security for help. Another effective approach is for the station agent to monitor the CCTV
occasionally to deter individuals from committing quality of life crimes, but not to rely on the CCTV
to stop all crime occurring in the station area.
3.5 Design Issues
Station design strategies include using several physical design tools to make passengers feel more
secure and to deter crime. All of the case study agencies utilized physical design strategies to
create more secure areas. Table 3-4 lists the design strategies utilized by the case study agencies.
The list includes most of the design strategies recommended in transit security design manuals.
Most of these strategies are not controversial among transit security experts and design
professionals. In fact, the transit systems that have not implemented all of the design techniques
above are older systems which were constructed without concern about security. Almost all new
systems are constructed with these physical design principles in mind.
Table 3-4: Design Strategies
Strategy Agency
Long Platforms WMATA
High Ceilings WMATA
No Winding Passage Ways (where possible) WMATA,
Long lines of sight WMATA, LACMTA
No hidden nooks or crannies WMATA, LACMTA
No Public Bathrooms WMATA
Graffiti Resistant Design & Materials WMATA, NYCT, LACMTA
Division between paid and unpaid areas WMATA, NYCT, BART
Closed cul de sacs and ability to close exit NYCT
and entrances with grills
Attention to Lighting WMATA, BART, LACMTA,
New Mercury Vapor Lighting BART
NYCT, BART
Police input into new and rehabilitated
stations.
Community input into rehabilitated stations NYCT
Off peak waiting areas NYCT
Landscaping LACMTA
Fencing LACMTA
Another component of physical design and security involves the connections between the transit
station and its larger community. To make transit passengers feel safe when traveling to and from
the station it is important that the transit station be effectively physically integrated into the
neighborhood community. The design of the station area should also take into account security
during intermodal transfers and connections, especially park and ride lots which are often subject to
crime.
Evuluution and Comparison of the CAse Study Systems
This chapter analyzes security data derived from the 1995 National Transit Database and
evaluates and compares the case studies using this data and information from the key strategy
areas.
Section 4.1 presents some important themes and insights to be gained from the security data in the
National Transit Database. First the type and limitations of the data are discussed. Then the
section presents the crime levels for the thirty largest transit systems, analyzes rail crime rates, and
compares transit crime levels with metropolitan area crime levels. Lastly the statistical relationships
between different types of crime occurring on the transit system are presented.
Section 4.2 presents an evaluation of the case studies based on data from the National Transit
Database and from their actions with respect to each of the five areas discussed in Chapter 3.
Table 4-6 summarizes the security programs of the case study agencies using 7 elements; actual
crime data (where available) passenger perception, and each of the 5 quality of life areas
discussed in Chapter 3. Then for each case study system, these elements are discussed in more
depth.
4.1 National Transit Database: Themes and Results
In 1995, the federal government recognizing the need for transit agencies to collect security data by
type of crime, by mode, by victim, and by location in the transit system required that this data be
reported and included in the National Transit Database. As the data were required for the first time
in 1995, they are just now available, may be subject to reporting errors, and do not yet allow for time
series analyses.14 The way in which the Federal Transit Administration categorizes crime in the
National Transit Database follows the Uniformed Crime Reporting (UCR) standards set up by the
1 Historically, transit agencies have needed time to adjust to the reporting requirements of the Federal Transit
Administration and data from the early years are often subject to more reporting errors.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. State and local police forces also utilize UCR standards which
categorize crime into Part I or Part 11 Crimes.
Part I Crime includes both violent and property crime:
* Violent crime includes homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault.
* Property crime includes burglary, larceny theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
Part I crimes are minor crimes and include;
* Other assaults, vandalism, sex offenses, drug abuse violations, driving under the
influence, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, fare evasion and violation of curfew and
loitering laws.
Part II crimes are measured by the number of arrests made by the transit agency. In contrast, Part
I crimes are measured by the number of crime reports the transit agency receives. This difference
in measurement of Part I and Part Il crimes is important. More Part 11 arrests may not mean more
Part 11 crime on the system, but rather may reflect a transit agency with a more vigilant approach to
Part 11 crimes.
Table 4-1 presents the total number of violent crimes, total number of Part I crimes, total number of
Part I crimes, and the violent crime rate at the thirty largest transit agencies in the United States.
The violent crime rate per million trips was calculated by: dividing the annual number of violent
crimes on the system by the annual number of passengers trips on the system. The median
violent crime rate for the thirty agencies is 1.275 crimes per million passenger trips and the
standard deviation is .897. Two agencies, Minneapolis St. Paul MCTO and BART, have
significantly higher crime rates than the other agencies. This range in reported crime rates among
transit agencies can be influenced by the following factors:
Table 4-1: Crime Levels for the Thirty Largest Transit Agencies in the United States1'2
Rank Transit Agency Total Violent Total Part I Total Part iI Total Crimes Annual Unlinked Violent Crime Per
Crimes3  Crimes4  Crimes5  Passenger Trips (in Million Unlinked
000's) Annual Trips
1 Minneapolis-St. Paul MCTO 244 338 5135 5473 61109.9 3.99
2 San Francisco BART 242 3452 7389 10841 78673.6 3.08
3 Portland Tri-Met 124 488 16459 16947 64537.7 1.92
4 Port Authority-PATH 127 242 613 855 67125.2 1.89
5 Baltimore-MTA 201 493 179 672 108468.2 1.85
6 Oakland-AC Transit 107 186 347 533 61943.4 1.73
7 NY-MTA-Metro North 106 1117 496 1613 62649.8 1.69
8 Chicago-RTA-CTA 742 2262 12969 15231 442226.2 1.68
9 LA-OCTA 70 94 521 615 42187.6 1.66
10 LA-LACMTA 532 989 14483 15472 363318 1.46
11 Boston-MBTA 447 926 7093 8019 321885.4 1.39
12 Denver -RTD 93 141 353 494 67132.6 1.39
13 Philadelphia-SEPTA 421 1067 1192 2259 322248.4 1.31
14 Cleveland-RTA 72 182 146 328 58289.7 1.24
15 Miami-MDTA 91 417 8 425 80839.2 1.13
16 Atlanta-MARTA 161 1127 2128 3255 143674.6 1.12
17 Dallas-DART 50 253 1290 1543 44692.5 1.12
18 Pittsburgh-PAT 68 266 504 770 73549.2 0.92
19 New Jersey-NJTC 162 977 738 1715 188871.1 0.86
20 San Francisco-Muni 179 877 788 1665 216408.2 0.83
21 Washington-WMATA 184 1226 865 2091 345012.3 0.53
22 NY-MTA-LIRR 52 524 765 1289 97736.0 0.53
23 Chicago-RTA-Metra 28 290 299 589 64534.0 0.43
24 Houston-Metro 26 145 543 688 80457.2 0.32
25 Seattle-Metro 22 157 2310 2467 83503.4 0.26
26 Washington State 0 11 1 12 13354.4 0.00
'Thirty largest transit agencies as defined by the 1994 National Transit Database. Due to lack of security data, New York City Transit Authority, Honolulu, New York
Department of Transportation, and Santa Clara Transit Authority are not included.
2 Data from the 1995 National Transit Database
3Violent Crimes include the following: Homicide, Forcible Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault
4Violent Crimes and the following offenses: Larceny/Theft, Motor Vehicle Theft, Arson
5 Part il Crimes include Other assaults, vandalism, sex offenses, drug abuse violations, driving under the influence, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, fare evasion and
violation of curfew and loitering laws.
* Type of transit system
* Modes within the transit system
* Age of the transit system
* Crime rates of the surrounding neighborhood
* Hours of operation
" Security program and policies
* Error/ differences in data collection
Thus knowledge of a transit agency's violent crime rate is not enough to indicate the effectiveness
of a transit agency's security policies and practices. More detailed statistical trend analysis and
research is necessary to understand how these factors affect transit agency crime levels.
Table 4-2 presents the heavy rail crime rates for ten rail systems and demonstrates that the rate of
violent crime occurring on heavy rail systems is higher than the rate of violent crime occurring on
the overall system (See Figure 4-1). 15 In contrast to the median system crime rate of 1.275 crimes
per million passenger trip, the median crime rate for rail systems was 3.17 crimes per million
passenger trip. Transit agencies also spend a disproportionate percentage of their resources
arresting offenders of Part il crimes on heavy rail. In 1995, the percentage of Part il arrests that
occurred on heavy rail were disproportionately higher than the percentage of heavy rail trips (See
Figure 4-2).
Table 4-3 compares the crime rates of five transit agencies to the rate of crime in the metropolitan
area. The units of measurement are different; transit agency crime rate is measured per million
passenger trips, and metropolitan area crime rate is measured per 100,000 inhabitants. This
difference in measurement makes it impossible to generalize about the crime rates in transit
15 Researchers have done some work to determine why transit agency crime rates may be higher on rapid transit than on
buses-Underreporting of bus crime to the transit agency especially when walking or waiting for the bus is considered to be a
primary factor. See the SEMCOG study 1979 and 1981 and Levine and Wachs, 1984 for more details.
Table 4-3: Comparison of Violent Crime on the Transit System With
Violent Crime in the Metropolitan Area'
Transit Agency & All Modes Total Annual Unlinked Violent Crime Per Violent Crime
Metropolitan Area Violent Crimes2 Passenger Trips2 Million Unlinked Per 100,000
Annual Trips2 Inhabitants
Metropolitan
Area3
WMATA, Washington D.C. 184 345,012,300 0.53 716.4
BART, San Francisco 242 78,673,600 3.08 884.3
LACMTA, Los Angeles 532 363,318,000 1.46 1422.6
SEPTA, Philadelphia 421 322,248,400 1.31 662.2
MBTA, Boston 447 321,885,400 1.39 644.6
Violent Crimes include the following: Homicide, Forcible Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault
2 Data from 1995 National Transit Database
31995 FBI Crime Index Data, except for SEPTA which uses 1993 FBI Crime Index Data
Table 4-2: Heavy Rail Crime Rates for Selected Transit Agencies in the United States
Rank Transit Agency Total Violent Total Part I Crimes Total Part |1 Total Crimes Annual Unlinked Violent Crime Per
Crimes Offense (Arrests) Passenger Trips Million Unlinked
Heavy Rail Heavy Rail Trip
1 Cleveland-RTA 49 98 56 154 6,949,400 7.05
2 Baltimore-MTA 54 253 46 299 10,556,500 5.12
3 Philadelphia SEPTA 394 914 1086 2000 86,611,300 4.55
4 Chicago-CTA 449 1608 12539 14147 135,461,600 3.31
5 San Francisco BART 242 3452 7389 10841 76,331,500 3.17
6 Miami-Metro Dade 44 268 0 268 14,204,000 3.10
7 Boston-MBTA 291 378 3491 3869 113,490,200 2.56
8 LA-LACMTA 13 24 1385 1409 5,887,700 2.21
9 Atlanta-MARTA 144 1046 1719 2765 70,351,000 2.05
10 Port Authority-PATH 127 242 613 855 64,734,200 1.96
11 Washington D.C.-WMATA 133 1108 745 1853 198,380,100 0.67
Figure 4-1: Comparison of 1995 Violent Crime Rates on Heavy Rail and on the Entire
Transit System
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agencies as compared to the crime rate on metropolitan streets. These data are included in order
to provide additional information about crime rates within the transit agencies' metropolitan areas.
Due to the emphasis that transit agencies place on heavy rail and the importance of quality of life
crime on heavy rail systems, a scatterplot was created to investigate whether there is a correlation
between the rate of Part I crimes reported to occur on the system and the rate of Part Il arrests
made by the transit agency. As Part Il arrests are closely linked to quality of life offenses, more
Part I arrests may be a result of transit agencies cracking down on the disorder of the system.
Does this cracking down on disorder result in decreasing the amount serious crimes in the transit
system?
As Figure 4-3 demonstrates, there is no systematic relationship between the rate of Part II Arrests
occurring on the system and the rate of Part I Crimes reported on the system. The lack of an
inverse linear relationship between Part I Crimes and Part Il crimes does not necessarily mean that
no link between disorder and crime exists. Several reasons can contribute to the results in Figure 4-
3. This chart does not measure the same agency, before or after a crack down occurred, but
instead presents a cross sectional analysis for thirty different agencies at the same point in time.
Moreover, transit agencies which are more prone to Part I crimes may be more prone to Part Il
crimes due to extemal factors, such as city characteristics, the age of the system, etc.
In addition Figure 4-3 illustrates that most of the transit agencies are clustered in the lower left hand
corner of the graph with a low rate of Part II arrests. However there are a few outliers which
demonstrate that there is a large variance in the amount of Part 11 Arrests. Part of this variance
may be explained by the way in which transit agencies crack down on fare evasion. For example,
most of the Part II Arrests at BART and LACMTA were due to emphasis on fare evasion. As
Tables 4-4 and 4-5 illustrate, the variation in the rate of Part 11 arrests per passenger trip decreases
when fare evasion is not included as a Part II offense.
Table 4-4: Part II Arrest Rates at Selected Transit Agencies"2
Transit Agency All Modes Total Part Annual Unlinked Part 11 Crime Per Million
11 Crimes Passenger Trips Unlinked Annual Trips
WMATA 865 345,012,300 2.51
BART 3  7389 78,673,600 93.92
LACMTA4  14483 363,318,000 39.86
SEPTA 1192 322,248,400 3.70
MBTA 7093 321,885,400 22.04
'Part II Crimes Include the following: Other Assaults, Vandalism, Sex Offenses, Drug Abuse Violations,
Driving Under the Influence, Drunkenness, Disorderly Conduct, Trespassing, Fare Evasion, Curfew and
Loitering Laws
2 Data from the 1995 National Transit Database
393% of BART's Part II Offenses are for Fare Evasion
487% of LACMTA's Part II Offenses are for Fare Evasion
Table 4-5: Part II Arrest Rates (without fare evasion) at Selected
Transit Agencies 2
Transit Agency All Modes Total Part il Annual Unlinked Passenger Part 11 Arrests w/out Fare
Arrests without Fare Trips Evasion Per Million
evasion Unlinked Annual Trips
WMATA 773 345,012,300 2.24
BART 3  1297 78,673,600 16.49
LACMTA4  4921 363,318,000 13.54
SEPTA 928 322,248,400 2.88
MBTA 6996 321,885,400 21.73
Part II Crimes Include the following: Other Assaults, Vandalism, Sex Offenses, Drug Abuse Violations,
Driving Under the Influence, Drunkenness, Disorderly Conduct, Trespassing, Fare Evasion, Curfew and
Loitering Laws
2Data from the 1995 National Transit Database
Figure 4-4 illustrates that there is no significant systematic relationship between the rate of property
crime and the rate of violent crime among transit agencies in the United States. In general the
graph displays a clustering of points in the lower left hand portion and demonstrates that transit
agencies have similar rates of property crime but differing rates of violent crime. In addition, the
figure illustrates that there are outliers with high rates of violent crime and one agency with a high
rate of property crime and violent crime.
Figure 4-3: The Relationship between Part I and Part |1 Crimes
(for the thirty largest U.S. Transit Agencies )
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(for the thirty largest U. S. Transit Agencies)
4 -
3.5--
3--
2.5--
. 2
C,
.2
0.5 --
0*
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
# of Property Crimes Per Million Passenger Trips
4.2 Evaluation of the Case Studies
This section briefly evaluates each of the case studies and explains how the system's crime
statistics compare with other transit agencies, discusses the results of passenger perception
surveys that the transit agencies have collected, comments on the actions of the transit agencies in
each of the five key areas where appropriate, and explains the overall transit security program for
the system. As each of the case study agencies use different measures to assess passenger
perception (as evidenced in Table 4-6), these results are not directly comparable. Crime statistics
and approaches to each of the five areas may also differ due to the nature and design of the
system. In general, however, all of the five case study agencies have worked hard to create a
secure transit system and passengers have favorable (or improved) perceptions of security on the
system.
While this assessment strategy for the case studies is not ideal, it does recognize that transit
agencies often do not collect the security data needed to conduct a comprehensive analysis of
existing or alternative security programs or policies. The deficiency in program and policy
evaluation occurs, in part, because data collection is time consuming, expensive, and may not be a
priority for the transit agency. In contrast, an ideal assessment strategy would analyze the ability of
the transit agency to achieve the following five objectives:
1) Reducing Actual Crime
2) Improving Passenger Perception
3) Maintaining System Wide Employee Support
4) Encouraging Broad Community Support
5) Achieving High Cost Effectiveness.
An analysis of each of these objectives would enable transit agencies to evaluate a security
program or strategy. Appendix 4 describes techniques and problems in evaluating each of these
objectives.
Table 4-6 compares the crime statistics, passenger perceptions, security costs per passenger, and
actions in the five quality of life security areas of each of the case studies. Each of the agencies
received either a minus, zero, or a plus for their actions in each of the five quality of life security
areas. In general if the agencies followed a well thought out approach that appears to be effective,
they received a plus. If their strategies were not as well thought out they received a zero. Finally if
the agencies had a strategy that was not carefully constructed, appeared to be ineffective, or did
not have enough resources do deal adequately with the problem they received a minus. Tables 4-
6 , 4-7 and 4-8 present the security costs of the transit agencies. In Table 4-6 two cost numbers
are calculated:
Total Security Cost Per Passenger Trip: Total Number of Passenger Trips
Total cost of security
Rail Security Cost Per Passenger Trip: Total Number of Heavy + Light Rail
Total cost of security
The rail security cost numbers make the worst case assumption that all of the transit agency's
security costs are due to the agency's rail system. This rail cost was calculated in the absence of
disaggregated cost data from the transit agencies. While transit agencies do spend money on bus
security it is not uncommon for transit agencies to focus a large percentage of their resources on
rail security. Note that these security costs include only security personnel and do not include the
costs of station agents and maintenance workers who also fulfill security functions.
Tables 4-7 and 4-8 also present the total amount the case study agencies are spending on transit
security. Annual personnel security costs range from $8 million to $33 million. Table 4-7 assumes
that the security budget is spread evenly throughout the transit agency. Table 4-8 assumes that the
security budget is concentrated on light and heavy rail. Again Table 4-8 serves as an upper bound
of rail security expenditures, as actual data on rail security costs were not available. Two other
agencies, MBTA and SEPTA have been added for comparison purposes. The tables also
calculate the percentage of operating budget the transit agencies spend on transit security. This
percentage ranges from 1% to 7% in Table 4-7 and from 6% to 70% in Table 4-8.
Table 4-6: Case Study Comparisons
Transit Actual Total Rail Security Passenger Ordinances CCTV Concessions Management Design
Agency Heavy Rail Security Cost per Perception
Crime Rate Cost per Passenrer
in 1995 Passenger Trip
Trip
WMATA .65 per .06 .11 Not a concern + + . + +
million in survey
passenger
trips
NYCT Decreased N/A N/A Security #1 + + + +
significantly deterrent to
in last few off-peak
years ridership
BART 3.17 per .21 .22 57% of riders 0 + 0 + 0
million felt crime on
passenger BART had
trips stayed the
same, 23%
felt crime had
increased
LACMTA 2.38 per .10 1.95 In the latest 0 . ..
million survey 75% of
passenger all passengers
trips satisfied with
security on the
system
Metrovia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 + 0 N/A
S
16 Assumes a worst case scenario by putting all of the security budget towards light and heavy rail
Table 4-7: Security Costs at Selected Transit Agencies
Transit Agency Budget-Security Budget -Security Operating Security as % of Annual Unlinked Security Cost Per
Personnel' Equipment' Budget2  Operating Passenger Trips Annual Unlinked
Budget Passenger Trip
WMATA $ 21,266,200 $ 919,200 $677,321,233 3% 345,012,300 $ 0.06
BART $ 16,000,000 $ 575,000 $217,425,724 7% 78,673,600 $ 0.21
LACMTA $ 33,000,000 $ 2,000,000 $717,418,906 5% 363,318,000 $ 0.10SEPTA $ 12,210,175 $ 110,000 $659,252,795 2% 322,248,400 $ 0.04
MBTA $ 8,480,372 $ 633,372 $742,149,248 1% 321,885,400 $ 0.03
' Data from 1996 TRB Survey
2 Data from 1995 National Transit Database
Table 4-8: Heavy and Light Rail Security Costs at Selected Transit Agencies
Transit Agency Budget-Security Budget -Security Operating Security as % of Annual Security Cost Per
Personnel' Equipment' Budget (Light & Light and Heavy Passenger Trips Annual Unlinked
Heavy Rail) Rail Budget3  on Heavy + Light Passenger Trip
Rail
WMATA $ 21,266,200 $ 919,200 $341,426,200 6% 198,380,100 $ 0.11BART $ 16,000,000 $ 575,000 $211,042,600 8% 76,331,500 $ 0.22
LACMTA $ 33,000,000 $ 2,000,000 $ 50,053,700 70% 17,914,300 $ 1.95SEPTA $ 12,210,175 $ 110,000 $168,194,600 7% 124,676,800 $ 0.10
MBTA $ 8,480,372 $ 633,372 $155,836,000 6% 185,009,300 $ 0.05
1 Data from 1996 TRB Survey2 Data from 1995 National Transit Database
3: Assumes all security budget goes towards heavy and light rail
4.2.1 WMATA
Metrorail has one of the most successful transit security programs in the country as it has one of
the lowest crime rates of any subway system in the nation. Nancy LaVigne compared the crime
rates of Metro to the crime rates of three other systems and found that Metrorail's mean crime rate
at 1.7 per million riders is significantly lower than the subway crime rates of Boston, Atlanta and
Chicago. 17
The 1995 National Transit Database illustrates that Metrorail had the lowest violent crime rate in
comparison to other heavy rail systems and WMATA had one of the lowest violent crime rates in
comparison to other large transit agencies (See Tables 4-1 and 4-2). 18 In 1995 over 50% of
WMATA's violent crime occurred in the station area (Table 4-9). However 73% of WMATA's
property crime in 1995 occurred at other transit property, which is explained in part by the parking
spaces and commuter parking lots in the WMATA system. WMATA had a low number of Part II
Arrests compared to other transit agencies and to the number of Part I Arrests occurring in the
system. In 1995, 88.7% of the victims of violent and property crime were passengers.
Table 4-9: WMATA's Rail System Crime by Type and Location 1
Type of Crime In Station In-Vehicle Other Transit Total
Property
Violent Crime 74 19 40 133
Property Crime 169 91 715 975
Part I Crime 613 40 92 745
Total Crime 856 150 847 1853
Data from 1995 National Transit Database
Table 4-10: WMATA's Rail System Crime by Type and Victim'
Type of Crime Patrons Employees Other Total
Violent Crime 121 12 0 133
Property Crime 862 92 21 975
Part 1 Crime N/A N/A N/A 745
Total Crime 983 104 21 1
1 Data from 1995 National Transit Database
17 There is speculation that WMATA's low crime rate is due to the low levels of crime in the neighborhoods traveled by
WMATA. This type of analysis was not the focus of this paper. However Nancy LaVigne did an analysis that compared
crime on Metrorail before and after the opening of the Green Line, which serves neighborhoods with lower income and
higher unemployment than the other Metrorail lines. She found that crime rates did not change dramatically with the opening
of the Green Line.
18 Heavy rail refers to subway and elevated systems, as does not include light rail or commuter rail statistics.
Metrorail passengers do not consider security a problem. The new General Manager recently had
passengers fill out survey cards to indicate their concerns about the system and passengers did not
list security as a major concem (Hanson, 1997).
WMATA spent $22 million on security in 1995. These security costs are in line with other transit
agencies. To repeat WMATA's major security policies include the following:
Table 4-11: WMATA Security Strategies
Technology and Labor Practices Physical Design Characteristics
* Communications System 9 Long Platforms
* Closed Circuit TV e High Ceilings
* Call Boxes & Hot Lines * No Winding Passage Ways (where
possible)
* Zero Tolerance Policing 0 No Public Bathrooms
* Station Attendants e Graffiti Resistant Design & Materials
9 Aggressive Maintenance 9 Attention to Lighting
In summary, WMATA has an overall transit security program that is very effective based on a
combination of strategies that work well together.
4.2.2 NYCT
The merger of the transit police and the NYPD makes it impossible to separate the techniques and
practices of the transit police from those of the New York City police, and to analyze the costs of
transit security and transit crime separately. Thus NYCT crime statistics were not part of the 1995
National Transit Database.
The New York City and the New York Transit authority have both experienced massive decreases
in crime since quality of life initiatives were launched. Between 1990 and 1995, robberies and
felonies on the New York City Subway decreased 75% and 64% respectively (Kelling & Coles,
1996, p. 164).
Security on the NYCT subway during off peak hours still remains a serious concern for many
passengers although this fact does not mean that NYCT security policies have not been
successful. Without comparisons to passenger perceptions before the quality of life initiatives were
launched, NYCT cannot measure improvements in passenger perceptions. NYCT realizes that
security is still a problem however and is continually developing policies to make people feel safer
on the subway during off peak hours.
Table 4-12 recaps NYCT's major security strategies:
Table 4-12: NYCT Security Strategies
Technology and Labor Practices Physical Design Characteristics
* Merged with NYPD e Community Input to Rehabilitation
of old stations
* Station Manager e Ability to close cul de sacs and
selected exits and entrances
* Systemwide Approach
* Attack on Quality of Life Offenses
. Strong Maintenance Efforts
* Extensive Market Research
NYCT has well thought out policies in each of the five quality of life areas discussed in the previous
chapter. Given the limitations they face due to the size, age, and complexity of the system, NYCT
has managed to develop successful strategies and policies that suit their needs. Overall, NYCT
has managed to develop a security package that works satisfactorily.
4.2.3 BART
In 1995 compared to crime rates at other rail transit agencies, BART ranked in the middle with a
violent crime rate of 3.17 violent crimes per million unlinked passenger trips (see Table 4-2).
BART's large amount of property crime ( a total of 3,210) is due in part to the large number of
parking spaces (and stolen cars) in the system. BART ranked second of the twenty-six agencies in
total rate of violent crime occurring in the system overall (see Table 4-1).
Table 4-13: BART Crime by Type and Location'
Type of Crime In Station In-Vehicle Other Transit Total
Property
Violent Crime 127 32 83 242
Property Crime 583 278 2349 3210
Part 11 Crime 6895 228 266 7389
Total Crime 7605 538 2698 10841
Data from 1995 National Transit Database
Over 50% of BART's violent crime occurred in the station area (Table 4-13). However 73% of
BART's property crime in 1995 occurred at other transit property, which is explained in part by the
large number of parking spaces and commuter parking lots in the BART's system. Approximately
29% of the property crime occurring in BART's parking lots is due to motor vehicle theft. BART
also had a large number of Part II Arrests, a large percentage (93%) of these arrests were for fare
evasion. In 1995 almost all (98.5%) victims of violent and property crime were passengers (Table
4-14).
Table 4-14: BART Crime by Type and Victim'
Type of Crime Patrons Employees Other Total
Violent Crime 241 1 0 242
Property Crime 1926 22 10 1958
Part Il Crime N/A N/A N/A 7389
Total Crime 2167 23 10
1 Data from 1995 National Transit Database
The 1995 Crime Perception Survey Highlights conducted by BART include the following:
57% of the surveyed riders felt that crime on the BART system stayed the same, 23% felt that
crime had increased, and 5% felt that crime on BART had decreased.
Most customers felt very/somewhat safe using BART, but they felt less safe in parking lots or
outside the stations. Women and night riders are somewhat less likely to feel very safe on the
trains than men. For example, 22% of those using bus stops/waiting areas felt somewhat/very at
risk, 30% of the night riders felt somewhat/very at risk, and 22% of those using parking lots/garages
felt somewhat/very at risk.
While 90% of all BART rider felt very/somewhat safe when on BART in the daylight areas; this
percentage dropped to 40% after dark. Interestingly BART riders felt safer in their neighborhoods
at night (73% of those surveyed felt very/somewhat safe ) than on the system.
In 1995 BART spent $65 million or 7% of its operating budget on security. Even assuming that
other transit agencies spend all their security budget for security on heavy and light rail, BART still
outspends all the other transit agencies, except for LACMTA. (See Tables 4-7 and 4-8).
Table 4-15 repeats BART's major security policies.
Table 4-15: BART Security Policies
Technology and Labor Practices Physical Design Characteristics
* Communications System New Mercury Vapor Lighting
* Call boxes and CCTV at Parking
Areas and (occasionally) in Police input into new and
vehicles rehabilitated stations.
* Zone Policing
* Attention to Quality of Life
Offenses
* Community Service Attendants
* Community Partnerships
* Strong Maintenance Efforts
The physical design and structure of the BART system may help in part to explain the higher crime
rates of the BART system and passenger perceptions of security. Higher crime rates exist both on
heavy rail and in large commuter parking lots. These factors, however, do not completely explain
the high crime rate, high rate of security spending and the mixed passenger perceptions of security
on the system. Furthermore transit agencies need to develop security practices and policies that
match the problems and physical design of their system. BART in the past two years has
continued to implement security improvements to enhance the security of the BART system,
especially at their Park and Ride lots. Unfortunately, the crime statistics for 1996 and 1997 are not
available and the latest survey is almost two years old. These statistics might shed light on whether
BART's security enhancement program has been effective.
4.2.4 LACMTA
In comparison to other heavy rail systems, Los Angeles has a relatively low crime rate of 2.56
violent crime per million heavy rail trips. While the total number of crimes occurring on the Red
Line in 1995 was low, (only 13 ), the Red Line does not travel very far or carry many passengers
(See Table 4-2). In comparison with other large transit systems, Los Angeles has a relatively high
crime rate per million unlinked annual passenger trips (See Table 4-1). However the high crime
rate of the Los Angeles metropolitan area and the alignment of the Red and Blue Lines through
some of LA's most crime ridden neighborhoods may contribute to this higher crime rate (See Table
4-3).
Table 4-16: LACMTA's Heavy Rail System Crime by Type and Location 1
Type of Crime In Station In-Vehicle Other Transit Total
Property
Violent Crime 10 3 0 13
Property Crime 6 3 1 10
Part l Arrests 1100 285 0 1385
Total Crime 1117 291 1 1408
Data from 1995 National Transit Database
Table 4-16 demonstrates that a high percentage (77%) of LACMTA's heavy rail crime occurred in
the station area, with less crime occurring in the vehicle or on other transit property. The small
amount of Part I crime which occurs predominantly in the station area is due to the fact that the Red
Line is only 4.4 miles long and does not have any large commuter parking lots. Los Angeles has a
large number of Part II Arrests; most for fare evasion.
Like most transit agencies, LACMTA also conducts market research and customer satisfaction
surveys; the latest survey conducted in July 1995, showed that 75% of passengers were satisfied
with safety on the system(Conte, 1997).
Transit security spending at LACMTA for 1996 totaled $35 million. This amount is 5% of
LACMTA's operating budget and in line with the percentage of security spending at other transit
agencies (Table 4-7). However this amount was 70% of the 1995 operating expenses for heavy
rail and light rail. (Table 4-8). While LACMTA is certainly not spending all of its security budget on
heavy and light rail, the RTD completed a study in which it estimated that $1.25 is spent on security
for each Blue Line rider but only 3c is spent on security for each bus passenger (Zamichon, 1992,
p. B3).
Table 4-17 summarizes LACMTA's major security strategies.
Table 4-17: LACMTA Security Strategies
Technology and Labor Practices Physical Design Characteristics
e Communications System 0 Barrier Free System
* Closed Circuit TV e Landscaping
* Call Boxes e Fencing
* Sensors e Adequate Lighting
e Attention to Quality of Life e Graffiti Resistant Design &
Offenses Materials
e Matching number of police at
specific stations to crime rates at
station
Los Angeles' approach to security is different from some of the other transit agencies as it relies
heavily on the use of police forces and does not utilize other personnel in the station area. While
security costs incorporate a significantly larger percentage of LACMTA's rail operating costs than
security costs at other transit agencies, LACMTA's total operating costs for light and heavy rail are
also significantly lower than other transit agencies. The crime statistics and passenger perception
surveys demonstrate that the security package on the LACMTA system does not necessarily lead
to higher rates of crime.
4.2.5 Metrovias
Newspaper articles about the Metrovias system demonstrate a general consensus that crime has
been reduced over time. Unfortunately, not enough information is available to evaluate and
compare the Metrovias system to the other case studies. Available information suggests that
security on the Metrovias system has improved since privatization and that the overall package of
security is effective.
Str(Aegies for San Juan
Chapter 5 discusses transit security in the context of San Juan, Puerto Rico. First an
understanding of crime and security in San Juan with respect to the Tren Urbano system is
presented. Then Section 5. 2 explains the way in which Tren Urbano's procurement strategy
affects the design and development of its security program. The third section compares the
contract requirements of the Tren Urbano with my recommendations for quality of life security
strategies. Lastly an evaluation process for the Tren Urbano system is suggested and conclusions
on Tren Urbano' s security program are drawn.
5.1 Understanding The San Juan Metropolitan Area
The population of the San Juan Metropolitan Area (SJMA) of Puerto Rico is about 1.1 million
people, and the region is facing severe problems of traffic congestion and suburban sprawl. Due to
the difficulty of traveling in the region and the desire for urban revitalization of the San Juan
Metropolitan area, policy makers and governmental officials have decided to invest in the
construction of "Tren Urbano". Phase I of Tren Urbano is currently under construction and will
consist of 11.8 mile heavy rail line that extends from Bayamon (an outlying municipality) to Sagrado
Corazon in San Juan. It is hoped that there will be subsequent expansions to create a
comprehensive rail system including Carolina, the airport, and Old San Juan.
Building a transit system in Puerto Rico raises many security concerns for potential transit travelers
as the SJMA faces problems in crime and security. Crime and crime prevention in Puerto Rico and
San Juan are serious issues that receive serious political attention. For example, the recently
elected mayor of San Juan, Sila Maria Calderon, focused on crime in the 1996 election and
promised to increase the San Juan police force from 800 to 1,000 officers (Associated Press, 1997,
p. M4). Govemor Rossello, the governor of Puerto Rico, spent his first four years of office (1992-
1996) combating the problem of crime, and he is continuing these initiatives in his second term. He
conducted many sweeps of public housing projects to clear out drug dealers. The governor also
increased the police force of Puerto Rico from 10,500 officers to 17,400 officers--the second largest
force in the United States and police funding has consequently increased from $265 million to $434
million (Curtis and Leusner, 1996, p. Al ).
In addition, in 1996, Puerto Rico had one of the highest homicide rates in the United States. Most
of the 869 homicides in 1996 occurred in the San Juan Metropolitan Area and were drug related.
Puerto Rico serves as a route for heroin and cocaine leaving South America to enter the United
States. While other types of crime in Puerto Rico have declined in the past four years, the number
of homicides has not decreased (Associated Press, 1997, p. A4).
Due in part to the high rate of drug trafficking and the resulting crime, San Juan has developed into
an urban landscape of gated communities and highly visible police. Henry Pierson Curtis and Jim
Leusner write, "Steels fences and razor wires separate once-gracious neighborhoods from the
street. Iron bars guard most doors and windows ....Wrought iron window grilles are traditional to
Puerto Rican architecture but not the new steel bars, security systems and gated communities
appearing everywhere." (1996, p.A1)
Public opinion surveys and focus groups have demonstrated the concern that residents of San
Juan and Puerto Rico feel towards crime and security. Drug shoot-outs and homicides attract wide
spread attention on radio talks show and in newspapers. In addition in series of interviews
conducted in Puerto Rico, residents cited drugs and crime as the primary factors causing Puerto
Rico's middle class residents to move to the mainland United States (Curtis and Leusner, 1996, p.
Al).
Not surprisingly, Alan Hoffman who conducted focus groups on the perception of transit in San
Juan, found many participants expressing concern about security when traveling. He writes,
'There can be no question that the fear of assault is one of the primary motivating factors
influencing decisions as to urban form, transportation choice, and even choice of activities within
the San Juan Metropolitan Area (1996, p. 93)."
As part of these focus groups, Hoffman also asked participants 'What makes a place feel safe?"
He received similar responses from all of the different groups he interviewed. Factors essential to
feeling safe include:
m Plenty of people in the area
* Well lit
* Clean
* Many escape routes
* Police; other guards
He also showed participants photographs of a subway and elevated stations and participants
voiced their security concerns such as "Fear" and "Unsafe if only a few people". One participant
mentioned the possibility of concessions as enhancing the area---'Well, if they put shopping there.
(1996, pp. 85-87)."
Community security concerns for Tren Urbano gathered by questionnaires and public meetings at
various station sites include the following;
Drug Dealing and Gang Activities
Assault and Battery
Armed Robbery
Arson
Petty theft
n Stalking or Harassment of Patrons and a
Staff
Source: Carlos Campillo, Security, Tren Urbano Office
Vagrancy and Solicitation
Use of Facilities by Transients
Lost Revenue due to Fare Evasion
Vandalism of Facilities and Vehicles
Riding motorcycles or horses in
guideway
Flight from illegal activities
These concems demonstrate that security and security planning must play an important role in the
design and construction of Tren Urbano.
5.2 Procurement Strategy for Tren Urbano
This section will discuss the role that the procurement strategy will play in the security design and
operations of the Tren Urbano system.
The Tren Urbano system, like all transit systems, needs to address the security concerns of its
passengers in the physical design as well as in items of labor and management policies to create a
secure transit system. However, the Tren Urbano system is being designed and constructed, and
will be operated in a different manner from most transit systems in the United States. As an "FTA
Turnkey Demonstration Project' the final design, construction and operation of the Tren Urbano
system is being contracted out to a consortium. This consortium will finish designing the system,
construct, and operate the system for five years (minimum) under the supervision of the
government, in this case the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority(PRHTA). The
PRHTA has created a Tren Urbano office and a group of consultants, the General Management,
Architecture and Engineering Consultants (GMAEC) to represent the government in this process.
The PRHTA awarded the primary contract for the Tren Urbano system to the Seimens
Transportation Partnership Puerto Rico, S.E.
The Tren Urbano system is a split turnkey, because while one franchise group, Seimens, is in
charge of much of the systems work (the vehicles, the yards, shops, two stations, and the
operations of the system), much of the civil engineering work has been "split" into six other
contracts. The role of the Seimens consortium is defined in a very detailed and extensive
document know as the Systems and Test Track Turnkey (STTT) contract.
The use of a split turnkey method has some larger implications for transit security and
management. The government of Puerto Rico decided on a turnkey approach in part because
they wanted to speed up the delivery process of the system. The turnkey process has succeeded
in accomplishing this goal as the time between the approval of the Final Environmental Impact
Statement and the awarding of the STTT contract was less than one year. In addition, turnkey
contracts allow for an integrated systems approach and delivery of the design and operation of the
system. This approach should create a strong relationship between the physical design of the
system and the security operations of the system.
The STTT contract was supposed to be based on 30% of the design and leave final design
decisions in play. Some of the physical designs have been developed past 30% as a method to
demonstrate the level of quality required by the contractor. These physical specifications can be
changed by negotiations between the contractor and the government. To achieve a synergy
between design decisions and security operations the contractor and the Authority need to engage
in an iterative process. Furthermore, for the security design initiatives to be effective, the smaller
civil contracts need to coordinate their work with the STTT contract to ensure that these security
designs are being implemented consistently.
In addition, there appears to be no direct incentive in the contract for the contractor to promote
security once the system is in operation. While security manuals will be necessary before revenue
operations begin, there is no penalty for not ensuring the security of the system. Other factors,
such as on-time performance standards, may result in a penalty if they are not met.
However, the STTT contract does emphasize the use of security measures and the importance of
security throughout the contract. The STTT contract does not have one specific section devoted to
security and quality of life issues. Instead, the contract states in Contract Book Ill Section 12.4-1,
"... security considerations will be integrated into all aspects of the design, equipment selection,
architectural concepts, procedures, and operations."
Throughout various portions of the contract, the physical design components and the technology
and equipment used for security are described in great detail, and the contract alludes to certain
types of security management. However, many of the management decisions will be decided in
security manuals that do not need to be submitted until one year prior to revenue service (expected
to begin in 2001). These security manuals will detail the deployment structures, staffing levels,
coordination between the "sworn police"force and local police, and dispatching.
Thus the following section highlights each of the major security decisions facing Tren Urbano and
draws information from differing parts of the contract.
5.3 Quality of Life Security Strategies for Tren Urbano
This section discusses the five key security areas and strategies for the Tren Urbano system,
Quality of Life Ordinances, Concessions, CCTVs, Management Options and Design Issues. The
contract requirements to the franchise on the design and management of these security issues are
described and then contrasted and compared to my earlier recommended security strategies.
Other quality of life issues important to the Tren Urbano system, such as intermodal security, will be
discussed in the last portion of this section.
5.3.1 Quality of Life Ordinances
Contract Requirements: The current contract does not allude to ordinances to regulate quality of
life crimes. In addition, as the Tren Urbano system is the only rail system in the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, it is unlikely that the Commonwealth has an ordinance regulating "quality of life
offenses" on public transportation systems. 9
My recommendations: I would recommend that the Tren Urbano office and the GMAEC work with
the Commonwealth to introduce a provision into the Penal Code of the Commonwealth that would
define and regulate "quality of life offenses" on public transit systems. I would recommend this
method rather than the codes used by New York, due to the administrative capability and resources
needed within the transportation authority to administer and adjudicate the legislative and
enforcement process.
Obviously the content and force behind this code would need to be carefully tailored to match the
needs of Tren Urbano and Puerto Rico, but these ordinances provide a valuable standard for
behavior on public transit and an important method to enforce these standards. I would
recommend that this code detail very carefully how to deal with issues of homelessness-quality of
19 A quick search on Lexus Nexus did not reveal any Puerto Rico codes that might be applicable to quality of life offenses on
the Tren Urbano.
life ordinances need to be prepared to meet legal challenges. 20 The ordinance should be narrowly
and carefully crafted to restrict behavior in time, place and manner (Kelling and Cole, 1996, p. 233).
I also recommend that the ordinance not forbid eating and drinking in the station and platform areas
(due to the nature of concessions) but to carefully develop a clause that prohibits littering in the
station area and on the vehicles. Passengers should be fined if they litter.
5.3.2 Concessions
Contract Requirements: Design Criteria, Contract Book ll, Section 6.5 of the STTT contract
promotes the establishment of concession facilities in the free areas of the stations, but does not
allow concessions in the platform area. Three types of concessions are listed (1) food, beverages
and tobacco products sold in the free area of the station (2) vendors selling flowers, magazines,
and newspapers and (3) automatic vending machines (which cannot sell food or alcoholic
beverages). The concession can either be built into the station area or free standing, but must
conform with the total design of the station. The STTT contract does not allow for these
concessions to obstruct the lines of sight, to disrupt passenger flow, or to increase the impacts of
litter in the station area.
My recommendations: The Tren Urbano system should encourage the use of staffed concessions
in the station/mezzanine levels and allow concessions in the platform areas, if the platform level
locations do not impede the flow of traffic. The details of the STTT contract appear overly specific
for a turnkey project, but do appropriately promote the use of concessions in the free areas of the
station. In addition, the GMAEC and Seimens should implement the policies described in detail in
Chapter 4 of this thesis. To repeat, these policies include:
20 In recent years, quality of life ordinances have most come under attack for stifling the first amendment rights of the
homeless.
. Developing a no littering campaign
* Utilizing vigilant maintenance in the platform and station areas to clean up litter
* Fining individuals who do litter
. Requiring that the concessionaires both on the mezzanine and platform level financially
contribute to the clean up of the station area.
. Requiring that concessionaires be open during off peak hours to obtain the security benefits of
the concessionaires
. Utilizing chain retailers to make passengers feel more secure.
* Training the concessionaires on the correct response to different types of security problems,
including whom to alert and contact if they notice a security problem.
5.3.3 Management Options
Contract Requirements: The STTT contract leaves many of the major security management
decisions to be decided at a later date in a security program plan and procedures and policy
manual to be submitted one year prior to revenue service. Contract Book Ill, Operations &
Maintenance, Division 17020 requires Seimens to employ security guards whose duties include
"passenger property protection, station security services, property protection, emergency response,
fare enforcement, and fare evasion prevention". These security forces will have to work with "a
governmental force of sworn officers" who will have the power to arrest.
The contractor will employ a security manager who will be in charge of security and report directly
to the General Manager. The contract leaves several questions unanswered including; Will the
Seimens' security force have police powers or will they simply be private security guards? How will
the Seimens' security force and the "governmental force of sworn officers" coordinate efforts? Is
the "governmental force of sworn officers" to be made up of local police from the three
municipalities of the Tren Urbano or a separate force managed entirely by the authority? What type
of management strategies will be used? These questions will presumably be answered in the
manuals required one year prior to revenue service.
In addition to the security personnel, the STTT contract in Contract Book Ill, Design Criteria,
Section 6. 11 describes the duties and responsibilities of the Station Control Booth (SCB). The
station control booth is located at the entrances to the station and allows for: monitoring of the
CCTVs placed strategically around the station, access to the public address system, and the ability
to monitor telephone, intercom, elevators, and ticket vending machines. A security/staff room is
also to be located in each station.
In addition the SCB must be able to coordinate with the Operations Control Center. The
Operations Control Center will have several security responsibilities when no station agent is on
duty which will include; monitoring the CCTVs, providing information to patrons, acting in
emergencies, and controlling the entrances and exits to disabled individuals at fare barriers.
The design and duties of the SCB imply that there will be a "station agent" of some sort who will
monitor the SCB and someone at the operations control center who will monitor the stations when
the station manager is not on duty. The contract does not specify who will manage the station nor
does it clarify the roles and responsibilities of the station managers or the way in which they will
work with the contractor's security force , the "governmental force of sworn officers" and the local
police force.
My recommendations:
Several key decisions need to be made by Seimens:
" The type of security force they will use; privatized guards or sworn transit police
* Role of station agent and operations control center
. Coordination activities between Seimens' security force, station agent, operations control
center ,"governmental force of swom officers", and local police.
* Type of patrol and management practices used by security force and station agent
The Seimens' security force should aim to maintain order by patrolling the station areas, becoming
familiar with those using the transit system, and deterring quality of life offenses. If privatized
security guards have the power to fine and detain individuals who are committing quality of life
offenses, and the ability to contact a "governmental force of sworn officers" when more serious
problems erupt, then privatized security guards may provide a more cost effective security force
than "sworn transit police." (Assuming, of course, that privatized security guards are cheaper than
"sworn transit police" and that the Authority is providing a "governmental force of sworn officers"" for
more serious problems). However, the Tren Urbano system travels through three municipalities,
San Juan, Bayamon, and Guaynabo, which potentially have three different local police forces. It is
currently unclear how the Authority's force of swom officers will interact with these "local police."
Coordination between the local police, the "governmental force of sworn officers" and the Seimens'
security force is essential to create a secure transit system.
I believe that it is important for Seimens to utilize both station agents and a security force. Station
agents have the ability to oversee the operations of an entire station, from maintenance, to
providing information to passengers, to monitoring the CCTVs. The station agents serve a different
role than the security guards who are actively fining and detaining individuals who commit quality of
life offenses.
Obviously clear paths of communication between station agents, the Seimens police force, the
authorities police force and the local police must be created. The station agents, the maintenance
staff, and the concessionaires should also have clear channels of communication. The security
force should interact with the community and address the community's concerns about security.
5.3.4 CCTVs
Contract Requirements: The STTT contract describes the use of CCTVs in several places. The
design criteria in Contract Book IlIl, Section 6 mandate that the station design allow for CCTV
monitors in the station control booth and the operations control center. Technical Provisions,
Systems, Contract Book V, Volume IV, Division 16736 of the STTT contract details the type and
amount of CCTV equipment to be provided. For example, individual CCTV subsystems will exist at
the stations, the yard and shops, and the operations control center. The operations control center
will be connected to each of these subsystems via a fiber optic cable system. Each station is also
mandated to have a minimum number of cameras, and one monitor for each camera will be
located in the station control booths. The camera locations are as follows:
m two or three at the platform's edge to monitor vehicle loading and unloading and to view
platform access and egress activities (stairs, escalators, elevators)
s one or two at ticketing vending areas
* one at each station entrance
m as many as needed to view public and employee parking lots
The capital cost of installing this type of CCTV network in the Tren Urbano system is relatively low.
A subsystem of about eight color stationary cameras with a monitor for each camera costs about
$14,000 to install. The price to connect each of these subsystems to the main operating control
center ranges between $3,000-$8,000. Thus for a system like the Tren Urbano with about eight
color and fixed CCTVs at each station, 12 stations, and a main control system, a capital cost
estimate might be approximately $200,000 for the CCTV system.
The STTT contract requires that the Tren Urbano system implement an extensive CCTV network,
but it leaves several questions unanswered: What type of policy will the station control attendants
use in monitoring the CCTVs? When station attendants are not on duty, and the operations control
center is monitoring the system, how will effective monitoring be ensured?
My recommendation is that the Tren Urbano system install the extensive network of CCTVs and
use the station agents to monitor the CCTVs in a manner similar to of the station agents in
Washington D.C. using them to deter quality of life offenses and maintain order.
I also recommend that in strategic locations the Tren Urbano system, alarms should be installed so
passengers can alert the station agent or the operations control center to a particular CCTV. This
alarm system will allow for more effective monitoring.
5.3.5 Design Issues
Contract Requirements: The STTT contract clearly dictates many design guidelines required by
the contractor. Table 5-1 summarizes the design requirements of the STTT.
Table 5-1: Design Strategies
Long lines of sight
No hidden nooks or crannies
No Public Bathrooms
Division between paid and unpaid areas
Graffiti Resistant Design & Materials
The ability to close exit and entrances with grills
Attention to Lighting
Off peak waiting areas
Fencing
Connections to neighborhood area
General design guidelines include maximum visibility from all areas, no hidden corners, intense
lighting, and vandal resistant materials. Contract Book 111, Section 6 details the need for station
entrances to be capable of being closed by iron grills; the role and function of the station control
booth, operations control center, and the transit dispatch center; and the role of fare collection
barriers and fences. In certain sections, specific criteria are listed such as the height of the fare
collection barriers and the type and position of the lighting. The contract divides portions of the
station area into high, medium, or low priority security levels.
Contract Book, Section 6 describes the station design guidelines to connect the stations to its
nearby neighborhoods. "The station site will be designed as a safe and secure zone who's purpose
is to serve the station. It shall be designed to discourage inappropriate behavior such as loitering,
vandalism, graffiti and poster application, illegal parking and other vehicular misbehavior and crime.
To that end the station site shall be clearly differentiated, well-lit and designed as a cohesive
"defensible" project. " The STTT contract then provides more specific design guidelines for
neighborhood development for two station areas, Los Lomas and Torrimar.
My recommendations: The STTT contract appears to have adequately created design guidelines
with a concern for security. Concerns remain over the relationship of the six other contracts to the
design of the system and the way in which they follow the design guidelines. More interaction with
community groups and potential passengers may be helpful in creating effective design strategies.
5.3.6 Other issues
Community involvement and cleanliness are important to the quality of life and security of the transit
system. The contract has sections describing the need for community interaction and involvement.
Transit security practices both in the design and management areas should work with various
members of the community to make sure that community input is used in making security
decisions. The contract also places emphasis on cleanliness, as graffiti must be removed daily,
and no vehicle is to be allowed in service if it has graffiti on it. Trash cans must be emptied and
never overflowing, and spills must be cleaned up immediately. These cleanliness measures are
part of the Tren Urbano's performance objectives and work towards preventing disorder in the
system.
Security planners for the Tren Urbano also need to be concerned about passenger security in the
areas surrounding the station and during inter-modal connections. As a large percentage of
passengers are forecast to arrive to the Tren Urbano system by modes other than walking (55% by
bus or publico, and 5.5% by auto), security during these transfers and at parking lots is important
(U.S. DOT et al, 1995, p. 4-8).
The station design guidelines in Section 6 of Contract Book IlIl require that the station area be a
"well-lit and cohesive defensible project". The guidelines also require that waiting areas for bus and
publicos be marked by lighting, and that landscaping of the parking lots be open enough to allow
surveillance. These contract guidelines however are not enough to promote intermodal security
and security in the station areas. These guidelines need to work with other design strategies and
management tools.
In designing the transfer areas, the contractors and the Tren Urbano Office need to follow the same
design principles that they are applying to the station itself. For example, off peak waiting areas
should be creating not only for those waiting for Tren Urbano, but also for those waiting for buses
and publicos. Security at Park and Ride lots is an important concern (as demonstrated by the
BART system) and telephone call boxes and CCTV surveillance should be set up in these areas.
The security management of the Tren Urbano must be aware of these parking lots, the surrounding
areas, and transfer points. Security guards and station managers should patrol and oversee these
areas as well, and if necessary security guards should escort individuals to their cars. In addition,
partnerships with local police should be created to help improve the security in the area surrounding
the station.
These suggestions have only taken a cursory glance at intermodal security and Tren Urbano
personnel need to think about this important issue carefully. Lastly, while research seems to
suggest that the security concerns of San Juan residents are similar to the security concerns of
residents in other parts of the United States, there may be cultural issues unique to Puerto Rico
and San Juan which affect the security approach taken by the Tren Urbano system. These cultural
issues and appropriate security responses need to be investigated.
5.4 Evaluation Methodology for San Juan
In addition to developing a security program and several key strategies to improve the quality of life
on the transit system, management of the Tren Urbano system (whether during design by GMAEC
or during Seimens operations) needs to develop a mechanism for continuing evaluation of these
strategies and policies. The development of a security program plan should fulfill the FTA final rule
requirement for a system safety plan and help Tren Urbano define and evaluate its security goals
and objectives.
First and foremost to this evaluation process is a data collection system that can record and track
the types of crime, the location, and the victims of crime occurring in the transit system. The
contractor should be in charge of developing and implementing this system, though the Authority
may want to oversee data collection. The data collection system should also be coordinated
closely with the data collection system of the local police forces and the authority's force of sworn
officers.
From this data collection the security planners will be able to make more informed decisions on
where to place resources and emphasis. This data collection should be tracked on at least a
monthly basis to trace crime trends over time. The data collection process should also include
surveys and focus groups on passenger perception. By tracking passenger perception transit
agencies can investigate the concerns of its passengers. These surveys should be done on a
regular basis. Security planners and officials should also analyze the cost - effectiveness of their
decisions.
5.5 Concidons
In general the STTT contract outlines many important security issues and demonstrates that the
Tren Urbano Office has seriously thought about meeting the security concerns of its future
travelers. The contract has requirements about areas being well-lit, clean, and mandates police
and security guards. The contract also outlines design guidelines, specifies the type of CCTV
equipment, and mandates the communication requirements necessary for a safe and secure
system.
The STTT contract demonstrates that the government has retained a large amount of control over
the contractor's decision making process. While leaving management decisions to the contractor,
the contract clearly dictates to the contractor many design decisions that impact the security of the
system. These design decisions appear to be well thought out and in most cases to incorporate
the successes and techniques of other transit agencies. While many of the security management
decisions of the Tren Urbano system have been left to the contractor to decide, the design of the
system will greatly impact the management techniques and tools of the contractor. The contractor
and the Authority need to continue to negotiate security design decisions to incorporate potential
innovations of the private sector and to capitalize on connections between design and
management.
The contract decisions on security design and security management have developed a solid
framework for the development of a successful security program. However, the Tren Urbano
Office and Seimens still need to continue to think about several important security issues including;
* Strengthening the connections between management and design
* Security Design coordination between the STTT contract and the civil contracts
. Security management strategies for the system
e Incentives to promote security
* Intermodal security strategies
* Cultural security concerns
* Security evaluation techniques
Investigating these concerns, the contracting relationships, and the transit security decisions of the
Tren Urbano should improve the proposed security plan for the system and develop important
lessons that might be applicable to other systems.
This thesis has described the importance of quality of life offenses, perception, and disorder to
transit security. The thesis highlighted and evaluated the context in which five case study agencies
make transit security decisions. Different types of transit security labor and management strategies
and evaluation procedures for each of the case studies were described. Recommendations and
strategies in five key quality of life security areas have been suggested. These recommendations
are applicable to the case study transit agencies as well as to the Tren Urbano system. In addition
to the specific recommendations in each of the five quality of life areas, this research has also
developed general lessons that are applicable to transit security programs. These overall lessons
and the limitations of my research are discussed below.
6.1 Key Findings
Following are the most important overall lessons in developing and maintaining security on rail
transit systems.
* All of the case study transit agencies prioritized the prevention of quality of life offenses and
utilized tools such as 'zero tolerance policing" and ordinances to deter these offenses. This
emphasis on quality of life offenses may lead to a decrease in crime and/or improved
passenger perceptions.
* A systemwide approach to security that includes maintenance workers, station agents, and the
support of upper management, as well as a highly trained security force is essential to
establishing an effective security program.
* Enforcement mechanisms and the ability to implement policy initiatives prove essential to
establishing a security program to deter quality of life offenses.
* All of the case study agencies recognize the importance of physical design in the development
of a secure transit system. These physical design security strategies in transit, innovative
when first implemented, are now acknowledged among transit security professionals as a key
part of decreasing crime and improving passenger perceptions for new systems. In addition,
these design changes can have a lasting effect on the overall security of a transit system
. Management tools that emphasize community policing and community partnerships can also
help strengthen the role of and support for transit police and help create a more secure and
responsive transit environment for patrons.
* Transit agencies should utilize "non-security personnel and resources" to help improve the
security of the system. Concession activity and station agents/station managers can play a
valuable role in improving the quality of life, order, and security of the transit system.
* Equipment and Technology like CCTV may help improve the perceived and actual security of
the system, but transit agencies must do more targeted studies to understand the effectiveness
of these devices.
* The National Transit Database documents that transit crime rates are higher on heavy rail than
the overall transit system.
6.2 Areas for Further Research
This thesis, however, also leaves many questions unanswered. Currently transit agencies do not
conduct enough targeted research to understand which strategies may increase or decrease crime.
Research and crime statistics are only beginning to be standardized across transit agencies and
the lack of standardization makes it difficult to compare passenger perceptions among transit
agencies.
The database (even just the first year) provides a valuable tool in documenting trends and
highlighting problems on an industry wide basis. However the National Transit Database only
serves as starting point for further analysis. Statistics in the database only address crime at the
systemwide level and transit agencies also need to analyze station specific trends, or crime trends
in response to a specific security policy. While the National Transit Database serves to highlight
several issues, it cannot address most policy solutions. The database demonstrates that more
crime occurs at heavy rail systems than on other parts of the system and points to station areas
and park and ride lots as areas with high crime rates. An analysis of why heavy rail is subject to
more crime than other parts of the system, and strategies for park and ride lots are important items
that need to be investigated.
This research only superficially investigates the crime rate of metropolitan area as compared with
the crime rate of the rapid rail system. An in-depth analysis comparing the crime rates of the rail
system with its neighborhood crime rates is essential to understanding the effectiveness of a transit
agency's security program. However due to limitations in neighborhood level crime data and
station specific crime rates this analysis remains largely undeveloped. Research that compares
crime at the station level with crime at the neighborhood throughout several transit systems would
provide valuable analysis in determining exogenous factors that effect transit security.
The analysis of Buenos Aires suggests that transit agencies in other parts of the world face similar
security problems as those in the United States. However a study which looks at more systems in
Latin America (or in other parts of the world) and draws comparisons between these areas and the
United States may provide valuable insight in transit security policies and practices.
No results from the case studies definitively resolve whether the use of privatized police agencies
or sworn transit police agencies can create a more secure environment. Also no conclusive
research documents whether the reliance of a system solely on police officers for security (without
the use of station agents) creates a more or less secure transit environment. Both of these areas
would benefit from more targeted analysis and research and an understanding of current policing
and security trends.
Finally, this thesis did not find evidence that strongly links transit security practices to disorder,
perception, and actual crime. Transit agencies and researchers still need to solidify these important
connections. All of these limitations clearly demonstrate that there is a need for more effective and
targeted security research on better security approaches.
Appendix 1: Questionnaire
Quality of Life Topics for discussion
Quality of Life offenses are those that disturb or disrupt patrons and increase their sense of fear. These offenses
do not physically threaten patrons and may have an effect on their use of the transit system. These offenses
include the following: disorderly conduct, homelessness/vagrancy, drunkenness, liquor law violations,
smoking/eating/drinking /littering/loud music, public urination, narcotics violations, sex offenses-(excluding rape),
prostitution, and graffiti.
I. Identifying Quality of Life Strategies
What are the major strategies your transit agency uses that may impact Quality of Life offenses?
II. Determining Transit Security Strategies
How does your transit agency determine which security practices to use?
Ill. Evaluating Security Strategies
How does your transit agency evaluate security strategies once they are in place?
IV. Data Collection
What type of data collection does you transit agency use to understand and analyze security strategies?
V. Policing Strategies
How do you research the role that transit police play in the prevention of Quality of Life offenses?
VI The Role of Non-Security Transit Personnel
What role if any do other transit personnel such as fare collectors, vehicle operators, maintenance employees,
and inspectors or supervisory staff play in the prevention of Quality of Life crimes?
Vill. Equipment & Technology
How does your transit agency investigate the role and cost/benefits of security equipment and technology like
CCTVs?
Vill. Station Design
How does your transit agency measure the impact of station design or re-design on security?
IX Passenger Perception
How does your transit agency measure/evaluate the way in which passengers perceive the Quality of Life
conditions of your system?
X. Other Activity
Has your transit agency investigated the role that concessions and other non-transit related activity within the
station area plays in Quality of life offenses and passenger perception?
Appendix 2: California's Penal Code
DEERING'S CALIFORNIA CODES ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 1995, Bancroft-Whitney Company
THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1996 SUPPLEMENT (1995 SESSION) *
INCLUDING URGENCY LEGISLATION THROUGH CHAPTER 196, 7/22/96 *
PENAL CODE
PART 1. Crimes and Punishments
TITLE 15. Miscellaneous Crimes
CHAPTER 2. Other and Miscellaneous Offenses
Cal Pen Code @ 640 (1996)
@ 640. Acts committed on or in facilities or vehicles of public or subsidized
transportation systems
(a) Any of the acts described in subdivision (b) is an infraction punishable by a fine not
to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($ 250) and by community service for a total time not
to exceed 48 hours over a period not to exceed 30 days, during a time other than during his
or her hours of school attendance or employment, when committed on or in any of the
following:
(1) Any facility or vehicle of a public transportation system as defined by Section
99211 of the Public Utilities Code.
(2) Any facility of, or vehicle operated by any entity subsidized by, the Department of
Transportation.
(3) Any leased or rented facility or vehicle for which any of the entities described in
paragraph (1) or (2) incur costs of cleanup, repair, or replacement as a result of any of
those acts.
(b)(1) Evasion of the payment of any fare of the system.
(2) Misuse of any transfer, pass, ticket, or token with the intent to evade the payment of
any fare.
(3) Playing sound equipment on or in any system facility or vehicle .
(4) Smoking, eating, or drinking in or on any system facility or vehicle in those areas
where those activities are prohibited by that system.
(5) Expectorating upon any system facility or vehicle.
1o
(6) Willfully disturbing others on or in any system facility or vehicle by engaging in
boisterous or unruly behavior.
(7) Carrying any explosive or acid, flammable liquid, or toxic or hazardous material in
any public transit facility or vehicle.
(8) Urinating or defecating in any system facility or vehicle, except in a lavatory.
However, this paragraph shall not apply to any person who cannot comply with this
paragraph as a result of a disability, age, or a medical condition.
(9)(A) Willfully blocking the free movement of another person in any system facility or
vehicle.
(B) This paragraph (9) shall not be interpreted to affect any lawful activities permitted or
first amendment rights protected under the laws of this state or applicable federal law,
including, but not limited to, laws related to collective bargaining, labor relations, or labor
disputes.
(10) Skateboarding, roller skating, or rollerblading in any system facility, vehicle, or
parking structure.
(1 1)(A) Unauthorized use of a discount ticket or failure to present, upon request from a
transit system representative, acceptable proof of eligibility to use a discount ticket, in
accordance with Section 99155 of the Public Utilities Code and posted system
identification policies when entering or exiting a transit station or vehicle. Acceptable
proof of eligibility must be clearly defined in the posting.
(B) In the event that an eligible discount ticket user is not in possession of acceptable
proof at the time of request, any citation issued shall be held for a period of 72 hours to
allow the user to produce acceptable proof. If the proof is provided, the citation shall be
voided. If the proof is not produced within that time period, the citation shall be processed.
HISTORY:
Added Stats 1981 ch 766 @ 1.
Amended Stats 1983 ch 576 @ 1; Stats 1985 ch 251 @ 1; Stats 1988 ch 311 @ 1;
Stats 1989 ch 1151 @ 1; Stats 1990 ch 261 @ 1 (AB 3844); Stats 1994 ch 541 @ 1
Distict of Columbia's Penal Code
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 1981-1996 by The District of Columbia
All rights reserved.
*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1996 SUPPLEMENT ***
*** (PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY LEGISLATION AS OF FEB. 9,1996)
(EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AS OF MAR. 31, 1996)
TITLE 22. CRIMINAL OFFENSES
CHAPTER 33A. PANHANDLING CONTROL
D.C. Code @ 22-3312 (1996)
@ 22-3312. Prohibited acts
(a) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms, including money and other things of value,
in an aggressive manner in any place open to the general public, including sidewalks,
streets, alleys, driveways, parking lots, parks, plazas, buildings, doorways and entrances to
buildings, and gasoline service stations, and the grounds enclosing buildings.
(b) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms in any public transportation vehicle; or at
any bus, train, or subway station or stop.
(c) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms within 10 feet of any automatic teller
machine (ATM).
(d) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms from any operator or occupant of a motor
vehicle that is in traffic on a public street.
(e) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms from any operator or occupant of a motor
vehicle on a public street in exchange for blocking, occupying, or reserving a public
parking space, or directing the operator or occupant to a public parking space.
(f) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms in exchange for cleaning motor vehicle
windows while the vehicle is in traffic on a public street.
(g) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms in exchange for protecting, watching,
washing, cleaning, repairing, or painting a motor vehicle or bicycle while it is parked on a
public street.
(h) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms on private property or residential property,
without permission from the owner or occupant.
HISTORY: Nov. 17, 1993, D.C. Law 10-54, @ 3, 40 DCR 5450.
NOTES:
SECTION REFERENCES. --This section is referred to in @ 22-3314.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LAW 10-54. --See note to @ 22-3311.
Appendb(3:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 1981-1996 by The District of Columbia
All rights reserved.
*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH THE 1996 SUPPLEMENT ***
*** (PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY LEGISLATION AS OF FEB. 9,1996)
(EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AS OF MAR. 31, 1996) ***
TITLE 44. RAILROADS AND OTHER CARRIERS
CHAPTER 2. STREET RAILWAYS AND BUS LINES
D.C. Code @ 44-223 (1996)
@ 44-223. Unlawful conduct on public passenger vehicles
(a) For the purposes of this section, the term "rail transit station" means a regular rail
stopping place for the pick-up and discharge of passengers in regular route service,
contract service, special or community-type service, including the fare-paid areas and
roofed areas of the rail transit stations (not bus terminals or bus stops) owned, operated, or
controlled by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority: Provided, that the
term "rail transit station" shall not include parking lots, roadways and other areas intended
for vehicle traffic.
(b) It is unlawful for any person either while aboard a public passenger vehicle with a
capacity for seating 12 or more passengers, including vehicles owned and/or operated by
the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, which is transporting passengers in
regular route service within the corporate limits of the District of Columbia; or while
aboard a rail transit car owned and/or operated by the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority which is transporting passengers within the corporate limits of the
District of Columbia; or while within a rail transit station owned and/or operated by the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority which is located within the corporate
limits of the District of Columbia to:
(1) Smoke or carry a lighted or smoldering pipe, cigar, or cigarette;
(2) Consume food or drink;
(3) Spit;
(4) Discard litter;
(5) Play any radio, cassette, recorder, musical instrument or other such device, unless it
is connected to an earphone that limits the sound to the individual user;
(6) Carry any flammable or combustible liquids, live animals, explosives, acids or any
other item inherently dangerous or offensive to others, except for seeing eye dogs properly
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harnessed and accompanied by a blind passenger and for small animals properly
packaged;
(7) Stand in front of the white line marked on the forward end of the floor of any bus
or otherwise conduct himself in such a manner as to obstruct the vision of the operator;
(8) Park, operate, wheel, or chain to any fence, tree, railing, or other structure not
specifically designated for such use, tricycles, unicycles, skateboards, or roller skates;
(9) Park, operate, carry, wheel, or chain to any fence, tree, railing, or other structure not
specifically designated for such use, mopeds, motorbikes, or any other such vehicle;
(10) Park, operate, carry, wheel, or chain to any fence, tree, railing, or other structure
not specifically designated for such use, noncollapsible bicycles, unless an individual has a
current permit issued by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority for the
transporting of noncollapsible bicycles by rail transit and the individual is complying with
all the terms and conditions of said permit: Provided, that an individual shall surrender
said permit upon the request or demand of any agent or employee of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Sections 44-225 and 44-226 shall not apply to a
violation of the terms and conditions of said permit.
(c) It is unlawful for any person, while aboard a rail transit car which is transporting
passengers within the District of Columbia, knowingly to cause the doors of any rail
transit car to open by activating a safety device designed to allow emergency evacuation of
passengers. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
person charged believed, in good faith, that the action was necessary to protect people
from injury or death.
(d) It is unlawful for any person at a rail transit station to stop, impede, interfere with, or
tamper with an escalator or elevator or any part of an escalator or elevator apparatus or to
use an escalator or elevator emergency stop button, unless this action is taken by a person
with the knowledge or the reasonable good faith belief that an emergency makes the action
necessary to preserve or protect human life or property, or unless such action is taken by a
WMATA employee, other government employees, or WMATA contractor acting
pursuant to their official duties.
HISTORY: 1973 Ed., @ 44-216; Sept. 23, 1975, D.C. Law 1-18, @ 2, 22 DCR 1994;
Feb. 22, 1978, D.C. Law 2-40, @ 2, 24 DCR 3344; Sept. 18, 1981, D.C. Law 4-3 1, @
2, 28 DCR 3120; June 29, 1984, D.C. Law 5-91, @ 3(a), 31 DCR 2539; Oct. 1, 1992,
D.C. Law 9-171, @ 2(a), 39 DCR 5831.
NOTES:
SECTION REFERENCES. --This section is referred to in @@ 6-911, 6-920, 44-225 and
44-226.
Appendix 4: Recommended Evaluation Critera
The objective of this appendix to develop criteria with which to evaluate alternative security
strategies and to highlight problems in evaluating transit security strategies and programs. These
criteria should serve as a guide for transit agencies in creating a process and standards with which
to evaluate security strategies and programs
The evaluation criteria are discussed on a systemwide level; that is, I examine the criteria as they
apply to the entire security program of a given transit agency. In addition, evaluation criteria can be
applied on a strategic level in order to understand how to evaluate a single policy. The evaluation
criteria consist of five factors necessary in assessing a security strategy or program. Ideally a
successful program would fulfill all five of these factors, and an effective program evaluation
process should be guided by them.
1. Reducing Actual Crime
2. Improving Passenger Perception
3. Maintaining System Wide Employee Support
4. Encouraging Broad Community Support
5. Achieving High Cost-Effectiveness
This appendix presents each criterion, describes techniques, problems and measurements used to
assess each, and discusses how to forecast the success of each in new security programs.
The evaluation of a total security program differs from the evaluation of a single security strategy.
In a systemwide evaluation the effects of different security strategies are aggregated and program
effects are easier to measure as successful or unsuccessful. In contrast, the benefits and costs of
implementing a single strategy may be hard to isolate. While a systemwide security program
should ideally, include all of the five criteria, a security strategy may only aim to achieve some of
these goals.
21 Two studies done in the late 1970's eady 1980's have referenced frameworks for evaluation. Lany Richards and Lester
Hoel in Planning Procedures for Improvinq Transit Station Security and Vincent Rouse presented a speech entitled
"Developing a Methodology for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Crime Reduction Measures for Mass Transit".
All transit agencies are currently required by federal legislation to develop a systemwide security
plan and program. This plan should discuss the goals and objectives, the scope, the management,
and the role and responsibilities of the security program (Balog et al., 1994, p. 5). Evaluating a
transit agency's security program can be done by comparing the agency's security goals,
objectives, and standards with the agency's actual performance. A transit agency should track its
performance to meet as many security goals, objectives, and standards as possible.
Just as transit agencies have established standards in service and operations planning, they should
develop system-wide security measures, standards, and policy objectives that are easy to
understand and assess. "Measures" refer to the way in which the transit agency tracks certain
criteria. "Standards" are acceptable levels or changes in the measures. "Policy Objectives" are
goals that the transit agency would like to achieve. On the strategic level, transit agencies should
develop measures and standards which fulfill the specific strategy. Transit agencies should also
recognize that they cannot measure all aspects of a security program. Each transit agency must
repeatedly review their security practices to determine the appropriate standards and measures.
1. Reducing Actual Crime
A systemwide security program should decrease the amount of crime occurring in the system.
Similarly, a security strategy should have a targeted approach to decreasing actual crime or
offenses, either in a specific location or with respect to a specific type of crime.
For Part I crimes, transit agencies, like police agencies, measure reported crime which may
increase or decrease due to changes in reporting mechanisms. Techniques in reporting and
classifications of crime may differ among transit agencies and may change over time. These
changes may cause comparisons to be inconsistent and unreliable. Transit Agencies measure
Part 11 offenses by the number of arrests made; thus, arrests could go up due to increased vigilance
by the police, while actual crime may be decreasing. More arrests may not mean more crime.
Furthermore, comparisons between a city's crime rate and a transit agency's crime rate use two
different populations-a city's crime rate is usually determined by the number of crimes per
resident; a transit agency's crime rate is usually determined by the number of crimes per rider.
Many transit agencies track reported crime by organizing operator reports, incident reports, and
dispatch logs in a database. Effective database management and analysis can help to locate and
identify crime trends and determine the appropriate measures for analyzing crime. Many transit
agencies have a full-time crime analyst assigned to this task. Noting the measurement difficulties
mentioned above, the following is a list of potential systemwide and strategy measures that transit
agencies could use to evaluate decreases in crime:
Potential Systemwide Measures:
m Annual change in the total number of crimes (Part I and Part II) occurring on the system
* Annual change in the total number of Part I crimes reported on the system
m Annual change in the rate of Part I crimes per million passengers reported on the system.
Potential Strategy Measures:
n Monthly change in the total number of crimes occurring at station x.
n Monthly change in the amount of graffiti occurring on the system.
Potential Systemwide Standards:
n The total number of crimes occurring on the system should decrease by 5% per year.
Potential Strategy Standards:
* Total crime at station x should decrease by 20% this month
Transit agencies can determine the systemwide measures described above with current reporting
practices that are now required by the federal govemment. However, determining the effects of a
single strategy on crime requires the transit agency to adopt a rigorous data collection procedures
before and after the implementation of the strategy. Ideally, such an analysis will isolate the effects
of that strategy. To forecast the effects of a strategy on actual crime, a strategy may be carried out
in a specific location and then replicated throughout the system if the results are favorable.22
2. Improving Passenger Perceptions
A quality of life security strategy or a set of strategies should make passengers feel more secure
and safe while using the transit system. People who perceive that the system is secure will be
more likely to use the system. Conversely, passengers who feel unsafe while using the transit
system will choose if possible to travel by other modes.
Assessing the effect of a policy on passenger perception may often require expensive market
research efforts and extensive knowledge of market research techniques. Transit agencies need to
carefully design market research studies on passenger perception and security to reach the target
population. Transit agencies may have difficulty in assessing the perceptions of certain segments
of the population and may often overlook the security perceptions of non-users.
Passenger perception can be evaluated by asking passengers their opinions of the security on the
system. Transit agencies use focus groups, surveys, community meetings and opportunities to
meet the staff to evaluate passenger perception. Passenger complaints may also identify
passenger's security perceptions. Transit agencies often employ sophisticated market research
techniques and market research experiments to determine the effect of strategies on passengers.
These studies may include interviewing individuals before and after a strategy has been
implemented.
For example, in New York City, transit agencies interviewed people about how secure they felt in a
particular station before and after the station was redesigned. Passengers were also invited to give
design suggestions about a particular station.
22 It is important to note the potential paradox between more and better data collection and passenger perception. While
better data allows transit agencies to make better decisions on deploying resources, this data can draw media attention to
the rate and type of crime occurring on transit. This focus on transit crime may in turn, increase passenger's perception that
the system is unsafe.
Passengers can be asked about how they feel or would feel about a certain type of strategy. Transit
agencies can try different strategies for a short amount of time, and survey passengers about the
effects of such trials. For example, NYCT conducted a series of surveys in which they asked
passengers if they noticed the appearance of a person distributing leaflets, the appearance of a
policeman distributing leaflets, or a policeman standing in place. They found not surprisingly that
transit passengers most remembered a policeman distributing leaflets. (Weiss, 1997).
An ideal method to measure improved passenger perceptions on the system level, is to carefully
design a systemwide survey to ask passengers about their security perceptions. This survey would
then be repeated, or updated in following years to measure improvement or differences in
passenger perceptions. The following measures could be used:
Potential Systemwide Measures:
x Percentage of passengers surveyed who do not perceive security to be a problem on the
transit system
a Percentage of passengers surveyed who feel safe on the system now, than previously.
m Percentage of women (or elderly) passengers who feel safe using the system after dark
On the strategy level, surveys could be targeted to assess specific issues. For example, Potential
Strategy Measures include:
n Percentage of passengers who felt safer in station x due to it's design and rehabilitation
m Percentage of passengers who felt safer in station x due to the installation of CCTVs.
Currently, most transit agencies conduct some type of market research that tracks passenger
attitudes. If possible, this market research should include passenger perception's about security
and might prove a cost-effective way of tracking passenger perceptions of security over the entire
system Transit security officials may also want to conduct their own market research.
The implementation of a security plan requires the efforts of the entire transit system. Upper
management needs to have a clear idea of the security policies, goals and objectives, so that they
can communicate these policies throughout the entire system. Different divisions that work
together on a security strategy need to have clear objectives, clear paths of communication, and
appropriate training programs for each division. For example, efforts to eradicate graffiti on a
transit system require maintenance workers to remove graffiti, police to apprehend graffiti artists,
all employees to be alert for graffiti artists and to notify maintenance when graffiti occurs, and a
community relations office to advise the public of the transit agency's efforts to eradicate graffiti.
Transit agencies may have difficulty communicating the security agenda throughout the system-or
prioritizing security as a systemwide goal. The requirement of a system security plan (now
mandatory under FTA rule) should work towards eradicating some of this problem.
Transit agencies do not usually conduct formal surveys to assess the level of employee support for
a security program or strategy, due to the fact that it may be more important to ensure employee
support than to utilize expensive methods to measure this support. However other methods to
assess employee support include:
m Interviewing selected personnel
m Assessing security training and practices
s Determining the role and gauging the support of upper management for security initiatives
3. Maintaining Systemwide Employee Support
Before a strategy becomes implemented all of the employees involved should understand and
support the new policy. Setting up strong channels of communication between the employees
involved, creating opportunities for employee feedback, and developing employee support should
help ensure a strategy's success.
4. Encouraging Broad Community Support
Politicians and community leaders need to support a transit security program or strategy that
requires taxpayer money. Transit agencies cannot solve the problem of crime without working in
partnership with community groups, other agencies, and the media. For example, transit agencies
can prevent vagrancy and homelessness on the system only by forming partnerships with shelters
and social welfare agencies. (In one infamous incident, a bus driver in New Jersey removed a
homeless person from the bus; hours later that homeless person froze to death). Other examples
of community involvement include meeting with community groups to discuss the placement of
lighting at BART stations in San Francisco to improve security and to ensure that the glare from the
lighting did not negatively impact the surrounding neighborhood.
Gathering community support may often require extensive time and effort and may be difficult to
assess quickly and/or correctly. The community itself may be diverse and divided and contain
differing points of view on an issue. The views of the community and the views of political
leadership may also change quickly or demand immediate solutions to complex problems of transit
security. The media may also have a powerful influence on community support for transit security
and may often highlight incidents occurring near a station as transit security issues.
The transit police need to work with the community, including community outreach, meetings and
partnership with transit agencies and other groups, and a honest relationship with the media.
As with employee support, transit agencies do not usually conduct formal surveys to assess the
support of the community. The following are suggested methods to assess community support of
transit security programs or strategies:
n Interviews with key community members and political leaders
a Media reaction to transit crime
n Analysis of existing community partnerships
n Voter turnout on transit issues
Understanding the community's possible opposition and trying to remedy its concerns is essential
in the implementation of a new (or controversial) security strategy.
5. Achieving High Cost Effectiveness
Transit agencies and transit security programs are continually facing budget cuts and must justify
and support the policies they decide to implement. Transit security strategies need to be cost-
effective and to incur financial costs that are low relative to the benefits of the strategy. Security
programs should work at decreasing many types of crime and, in all cases, need to consider low
cost alternatives. Transit agencies and transit security personnel cannot afford to support
strategies with high cost but little benefit.
Placing cost and benefits in financial terms to calculate the cost effectiveness of a specific strategy
or set of strategies may pose extreme difficulties. Qualitative benefits (such as customer
satisfaction) may be hard to quantify in monetary terms, as may be accounting for (dis)economies
of scale and savings from offenses not committed. Also security costs may be allocated
throughout the entire system and not allocated directly to the security budget. For example, the
station manager plays an effective role in creating a more secure area, but also serves other
functions.
Transit agencies can evaluate the financial costs of future policies by developing a pro forma
cost/benefit analysis of anticipated financial costs and rewards. The following are potential
systemwide measures for security cost effectiveness:
m Security cost per annual unlinked passenger trip and violent crime per passenger trip in
comparison with other agencies. (Numerous characteristics such as station design may cause
differences in operating costs among transit agencies, but this measure provides some context
to the issue.)
Potential Strategy Measures for Security Cost Effectiveness:
m Cost of strategy per crime deterred (Transit agencies can determine the amount of crime
deterred by analyzing crime rates before and after the implementation of the strategy).
Currently transit agencies do not undertake detailed cost-benefit analysis of security policies,
primarily because the benefits are extremely difficult to measure.
Works Cited
Associated Press, (January 14 1997). "San Juan's New Mayor Promises To Fight City's
Poverty, Drugs Other Priorities Will Be To Improve Health Care And Fix The Puerto Rican Capital's
Faltering Finances, She Said." Orlando Sentential, Metro A4
Anderson, David (February 9, 1997). "Crime Stopper" New York Times Magazine: Section 6, p.
47.
BART Police Department, "Long Range Plan"
BART Police Department, (September 19 1995). 1995 Crime Perception Survey Highlights
Balog, John, Anne N. Schwartz and Bernard C. Doyle (1994). Transit Security Procedures
Guide Washington, D.C.: Office of Safety and Security, Federal Transit Administration U.S.
Department of Transportation. FTA-MA-90-7001-94-2.
Boyd, Maier & Associates (1996). Perspectives on Transit Security in the 1990s: Strategies for
Success. Washington, D.C.: Office of Program Management, Office of Safety and Security; U.S.
Department of Transportation.
(1995). Transit System and Police Department Characterization unpublished
surveys completed by WMATA, LACMTA, SEPTA, MBTA, and BART for a study.
Carbajo, Jose and Antonio Estache (1995). "Railway Concessions--Heading Down the Right
Track in Argentina" Public Policy for the Private Sector The World Bank Group, Note No, 88
Chaiken et al. (1974) Impacts of Police Activities and Crime Robberies in the New York
Subway System Report No. R-1 424 New York: Rand Institute.
Clarke, Ronald, ed. (1996). Crime Prevention Studies, Volume 6. Monsey, NY: Criminal
Justice Press.
Conte, Dennis. LACMTA. Telephone interview. December 1996
Curtis, Henry Pierson and Jim Leusner (October 27, 1996). "An Island Under Siege" The
Orlando Sentinel, Metro-Al.
Felson, Marcus et al. (1996) "Redesigning Hell: Preventing Crime and Disorder at the Port
Authority Bus Terminal." in Crime Prevention Studies, Volume 6. edited Ronald V. Clarke, Monsey,
NY: Criminal Justice Press.
Gee, Gary (January 1997). BART Commander Operations Division. Telephone interview.
Glazer, Nathan (1984). "On Subway Graffiti in New York" In The Public Interest on Crime and
Punishment edited by Nathan Glazer. Cambridge, MA: Abt Books.
Guitian Roberto (February 1997). Written correspondence translated by Adam Roman.
Hanson, Polly (January 1997).WMATA. Telephone Interview.
Hoel, Lester (1992)."Public Transportation Security" Chapter 18 in Public Transportation edited
by Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Hoffman, Alan (February 1996). Toward a Positioning Strategy for Transit Services in
Metropolitan San Juan Research thesis for MIT.
Horowitz, Alan (1995). Evaluation of Intermodal Passenger Transportation Facilities .
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee & Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, DOT-T-95-02.
Hubaud, Louis (1992). "Security for Los Angeles Metro Blue Line" Transportation Research
Record, No. 1361, p. 312-319.
Ingalls, Gerald et al. (1994). "Public Fear of Crime and Its role in Bus Transit Use."
Transportation Research Record, No. 1433, pp.201-211.
Interactive Elements Inc. (1996) TRB/TCRP Transit Policing Project Transit System Survey.
Unpublished surveys of LACMTA, WMATA, and BART as part of TRB study.
Jacobs, Jane (1961). The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Vintage
Books..
Joe, Nelton. BART, Sergeant, Planning and Research, (December 1996). Telephone
interview.
Kelling George and Catherine M. Coles (1996). Fixing Broken Windows . The Free Press: New
York.
Kenney, Dennis Jay (1987) . Crime, Fear and the New York City Subways-The Role of Citizen
Action New York: Prager.
Korach, Kenneth, President Transportation Resource Associates, (February 1997). Telephone
interview.
Kraus, Clifford (Friday December 20,1996). "Rate Plummets Not Seen in Thirty Years " New
York Times, p.A1, B1.
LaVigne, Nancy (1996). "Safe Transport: Security by Design on the DC Metro. " in Crime
Prevention Studies, Volume 6. edited Ronald V. Clarke, Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
Lichblau, Eric and Richard Simon (14 January 1996) "Plan to Scrap Transit Police Force
Gains". Los Angeles Times, B1.
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (October 1994) "Metro Blue Line
Activities Report."
Mckay. Ron (1997). Notes from slide presentation to the Encounter Ill-UPR/MIT Exchange.
Murray, Charles (1995). "The Physical Environment" in Crime edited by James Q. Wilson, and
Joan Petersilia, San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
Newman, Oscar (1971). Architectural Design for Crime Prevention Washington D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice.
New York City Transit Authority, Rules of Conduct Part 1050.
"Policing for Profit" (19th April 1997) The Economist.
PennDOT Rail Transit Safety Review Program ( February 16,1996) Rail Fixed Guideway
Systems Requirements for State Safety Oversight Agencies as Identified in the Federal Transit
Administration Final Rule 49 CFR Part 659 Philadelphia, PA:.
Richards, Larry and Lester Hoel (1980). Planning Procedures for Improving Transit Security.
Washington D.C.: Office of University Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation.
Rofe, John (20 October 1993). "Crime kept derailed on L.A. Tracks / High Police presence
keeps railways safe." The San Diego Union Tribune, A-3.
Rouse, Vincent (1977). Lecture by and comments to "Developing a Methodology for Evaluating
the Effectiveness of Crime Reduction Measures for Mass Transit Systems" In Proceedings of a
Workshop on Methodology for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Transit Crime Reduction Measures
in Automated Guideway Transit Systems edited by Walter Hawkins and E. Donald Sussman.
Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Technology Development and
Deployment.
Schnell, John B. et al. (1973) Vandalism and Passenger Security. A study of Crime and
Vandalism on Urban Mass Transit Systems in the United States and Canada. Washington, D.C.:
Department of Transportation, UMTA.
Shellow et al. (1974). "Crime in Rapid Transit Systems: An Analysis and a Recommended
Security and Surveillance System" Transportation Research Record Volume 487,1-13.
Southern California Association of Governments, (April 1976). Transit Safety and Security-A
Design Framework.
Thrasher, Edward J. and John B. Schnell (1974). "Studies of Public Attitudes Toward Transit
Crime and Vandalism" Transportation Research Record Volume 487, 26-33.
Wentworth Wally, NYCT Market Research Department (December 1996). Telephone
interview..
Weiss, Rudy. NYCT Police Liaison, (January 1997) Telephone interview..
Wilson, James Q. (1983) Thinking About Crime (Revised Addition) New York: Vintage Books.
Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling. (March, 1981).Broken Windows article reprinted from
the Atlantic Monthly.
U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Transit Administration, and the Government of
Puerto Rico Department of Transportation and Public Works Highway and Transportation
Authority. (November 1995) Final Environmental Impact Statement San Juan, Puerto Rico.
U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Transit Administration, and the Government of
Puerto Rico Department of Transportation and Public Works Highway and Transportation
Authority. (26 June 1996) Phase I of the Tren Urbano Systems and Test Track Turnkey Contract.
Contract No. 500006 Contract Books l-V, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Zamichon, Nora. (12 November 92) 'Transit Officials Undecided About Who Will Patrol Red
Line Subway: Use of the LAPD at a cost of $6 million is preferred over transit police for $2.1
million" Los Angeles , B3.
